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Abstract
This article discusses the freedom to associate or not to
associate with others. Associational issues are pervasive in
the law, and arise on both an individual and a societal level.
Within societies one party may want to have an association with
another who doesn’t want the association, or parties may want to
have an association that others find objectionable or may want
not to have an association that others favor. In all of these
situations society as a whole must decide whether to empower one
party to impose an unwanted relationship on others, and whether
to prohibit associations that parties want or impel associations
that parties don’t want. Similar issues arise among societies,
where parties may resort to international law to resolve
associational conflicts or in the absence thereof will have to
work out associational conflicts among themselves. The thesis
of the paper is that there is no general moral or legal
principle for resolving such associational issues. Rather their
resolution depends on historical and social context, and
ultimately on societies’ ever evolving values. In particular,
associational issues will affected by the extent to which a
society’s values are more individualistic or collective. By way
of illustrating the point the article discusses the factors that
might come in to play in a variety of associational contexts,
including marriage, race relations, emigration and immigration,
and others.
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ON THE FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE OR NOT TO
ASSOCIATE WITH OTHERS
Thomas Kleven*
It is commonly asserted in casual conversation that there
is or should be a right to associate or not to associate with
whom one chooses.

In fact, however, societies frequently induce

associations people don’t want to have and deter those they do.
This article addresses the types of situations that give rise to
associational issues and the considerations relevant to their
resolution.

It does not attempt to develop a general theory of

free association, about the possibility of which I am skeptical
given the unresolvable value disputes underlying all
associational issues.

However, unpacking how differing

associational issues are resolved in practice within and among
societies should shed some light on what those values are.
Part A outlines the types of situations in which
associational issues arise.

How associational issues are

resolved depends greatly on whether a more individualistic or
collective perspective is brought to bear.

Part B develops this

point in general through a discussion of Locke and Aristotle,
and Part C illustrates the point through a brief excursion into
the institution of marriage.

Part D then analyzes in more

detail how the process plays out as regards conflicts among
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society’s members, while Part E does the same when society
itself is a party.1
A.

Types of Associational Issues
Associational conflicts abound in social life.

Within a

society Party A may wish to associate with Party B, who may not
wish to associate with Party A.

Examples include A’s desire,

not shared by B, to be friends with or to marry or to remain
married to B, to go to school with or live in the same
neighborhood as B, to belong to the same club or professional
association as B, and many more.2

To resolve these conflicts

society could empower A to force the association on B, empower B
to avoid the association, or have society itself resolve the
matter pursuant to criteria which may take into account the
wishes of the parties and other considerations society deems
relevant.
Or Party A and Party B may wish to have an association that
society as a whole finds objectionable, or conversely may wish
not to have an association that society desires.

Here society

must decide whether to abide by the wishes of the parties or to

1

For other treatments of free association, see, e.g., FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Amy
Gutmann, ed., Princeton University Press 1998)(articles discussing from a
variety of perspectives the importance of free association within a society
and factors relevant to the resolution of conflicts over free association.
2
Even situations as seemingly impersonal as taxation, as when society seeks
to compel those who don’t want to participate to financially support public
programs that benefit others, entail associational conflicts. A relationship
between parties on a purely financial level is still a type of association,
and poses questions that quite resemble those arising in more intimate
associations.
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prevent or compel the association against the parties’ wishes.
Examples of preventing associations that parties wish to have
include the regulation of sexual behavior or criminalizing
conspiracies in restraint of trade.

Examples of compelling

associations parties do not wish to have include the draft or
forced integration.
Or society itself may be involved as a party to an
associational conflict, as when someone wants to leave or enter
a society against society’s wishes, or when people occupying
part of a society wish unilaterally to secede.

Here society

must decide whether to accede to the other party or impose (or
try to impose) its will.

Or all the involved parties may be

societies, as when nations have territorial disputes, or when
nations wish to impose on or unilaterally withdraw from treaties
with other nations.

Here the international community may try to

intervene similar to a society’s resolution of conflicts among
its members, in the absence of which societies have to work it
out among themselves.
In all these associational contexts, someone or some entity
must ultimately control the outcome of the existence or not of
an association.

Parties cannot at the same time both be and not

be friends, be and not be married, attend integrated and
segregated schools, participate together in some societal
venture and not participate, be a member and not be a member of

4

society, be a party and not be a party to a treaty.

And all

societies have ways, through law and custom and at times brute
force, of allocating the power to control the outcome in such
associational contexts and of compelling or inducing the
adherence of their members and others.

The purpose of this

paper is to examine the ways in which that power is allocated,
toward the end of identifying and evaluating the considerations
that underlie the differing resolutions of associational
conflicts in divergent social contexts.3
B. Who Should Control: Individual and Collective Perspectives
One’s view of the appropriate resolution of associational
conflicts and of who should control the outcome is dependent to
a great degree on one’s view of the nature of social life, and
in particular on the extent to which one has an individualistic
or communal view of social life.
The extreme individualistic view posits the primacy of the

3

This is not the place to attempt a thorough explication of the meaning of
the concept “society”, which has to do with such factors as interdependence,
common values and culture, authoritative institutions, territoriality, and
the perception of its members. By and large herein I use society to refer to
something on the order of a country or nation. But depending on which
factors are emphasized, the concept is flexible enough to include
associations from those as small as a nuclear family to the world community
as a whole. Consequently, it is possible for someone to be a member of many
societies at the same time, both public and private and with or without a
formal governmental structure. And each society may have its particular
method of resolving associational issues, although the types of
considerations that come into play may correspond. On the nuances in meaning
of the concepts of society, community and nation, and on their constitutive
factors, see generally KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (2d ed., M.I.T. Press 1966); ANTHONY D. SMITH,
NATIONAL IDENTITY (University of Nevada Press 1991).

5

individual.4

The individual precedes society and all

relationships; and society and any relationship is only
justifiable or consistent with the rights of the individual when
people freely choose to enter society or form relationships.
The extreme communal view posits the primacy of the collective
over the individual.5

People are inevitably and unavoidably

enmeshed in relationships because they are by nature social
animals born into relationships not only with their parents but
on some level with all others, because their fates are
inescapably intertwined with the fates of all others and their
welfare inescapably interdependent with the welfare of all
others, and because in some way all their actions affect all
others and they are affected by the actions of all others.6
Consequently, many relationships which may seem to be freely
chosen or rejected are, in fact, highly conditioned by the
social circumstances in which people find themselves.

And

society at large has a legitimate interest in preventing and
imposing relationships in the name of the common good.

Even

those relationships that are left to private choice entail a

4

As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of John Locke and Robert
Nozick. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (The Liberal Arts Press
1952) (originally published in 1690); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(Basic Books 1974).
5
As expressed, for example, in the philosophies of Aristotle and Michael J.
Sandel. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS (Cambridge University Press 1988); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (Cambridge University Press 1982).
6
There is no exit. Even death does not fully avoid relationships, which may
continue in the form of obligations imposed on one’s estate or of the
influence one continues to have on others after death.
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collective decision that society is better off by so treating
them.
The reality of social life in all modern, and perhaps all
historical, societies is some blend of individualistic and
communal thinking.

Some types of relationships are more or less

freely chosen, while others are more or less involuntary or
imposed; and often the line between free choice, involuntariness
and imposition is blurry.

And the treatment of particular

relationships as more open to choice or as more subject to
imposition is a function of both individualistic and collective
considerations which may cut both ways.

In many if not most

instances it will be possible to advance both types of
considerations for or against treating relationships as open to
choice or subject to imposition.
This interplay between the individual and the collective
can be found in even the most individualistic and communal
thinkers; for example, Locke and Aristotle, who certainly
represent thinkers close to the opposite ends of the spectrum.
For Locke, political (and by extension social) life begins when
people in “a state of perfect freedom…by their own consents…make
themselves members of some body politic.”7

Within given

societies people then “by compact and agreement” establish rules

7

LOCKE, supra note 4, at 4, 11. “Men being, as has been said, by nature all
free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate without
his own consent.” Id. at 54.
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regarding the control and distribution of property and other
resources,8 and “by common consent” states do the same thing as
among themselves.9

Locke’s emphasis on consent, which is at the

heart of contemporary libertarianism,10 is a highly
individualistic view that at first blush would seem to make it
difficult ever to justify imposing a political or any other
relationship on someone.
But there are qualifications that bring collective
considerations into play.

One is the obligation Locke imposes

on people not to use their freedom so as “to harm another”,11 and
the related limitation on their right to freely appropriate the
common resources of the state of nature that they leave “enough
and as good … in common for others.”12

These qualifications

force people into relationships with others whether they like it
or not: by having to take the interests of others into account
in planning one’s own behavior, or having to respond to the
complaints of others that one has violated the qualifications,
or having to bargain and coordinate with others so as to
minimize conflict over and prevent overexploitation of

8

LOCKE, supra note 4, at 27.
Id.
10
See NOZICK, supra note 4, at 334 (“Voluntary consent opens the border for
crossings”; “Treating us with respect by respecting our rights, (the minimal
state) allows us, individually or with whom we choose, to choose our life and
to realize our ends and our conception of ourselves, in so far as we can,
aided by the voluntary cooperation of other individuals possessing the same
dignity”).
11
LOCKE, supra note 4, at 5.
12
Id. at 17.
9

8

resources.

Such necessities help explain why Nozick describes

the development of his Lockean Minimal State less as a voluntary
coming together than as a spontaneous, almost automatic
process.13
Second, even with regard to voluntary political
relationships, once someone “by actual agreement and any express
declaration” consents thereto, the person becomes “subject to
the government and dominion of that commonwealth as long as it
has a being…and can never again be in the liberty of the state
of nature.”14

Moreover, once someone becomes a member of a

society “he authorizes the society…to make laws for him as the
public good of the society shall require,”15 and within the
society “the majority have a right to act and conclude the
rest.”16

In short, through consensually entering into a societal

relationship, one may not withdraw from that relationship and
can then have (or is deemed to consent to have) many other types
of relationships imposed on the party pursuant to collective
considerations.
Locke must, of course, deal with the question of people who

13

NOZICK, supra note 4, at 10-25, 108-119 (describing the “invisible-hand”
process by which a “minimal state” arises out of the anarchic state of nature
as a means of people’s protecting their rights and interests). “Out of
anarchy, pressed by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection associations,
division of labor, market pressures, economies of scale, and rational selfinterest, there arises something very much resembling a minimal state or a
group of geographically distinct minimal states.” Id. at 16-17.
14
LOCKE, supra note 4, at 69.
15
Id. at 50
16
Id. at 55.
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are born into already existing societies, which is to say most
people throughout history.

If after a society’s initial

consensual founding everyone born into it automatically and
irrevocably became members of it, that would be the end of the
consensual nature of political relationships.

So Locke

propounds that “a child is born subject to no country or
government,”17 and upon becoming an adult is “at liberty what
government he will put himself under.”18
But what constitutes the exercise of that liberty may be
quite subtle indeed and highly constrained as a practical
matter.

Constrained because “the son cannot ordinarily enjoy

the possessions of his father but under the same terms his
father did, by becoming a member of the society.”19

Constrained

because the socialization process and a multitude of economic
and emotional bonds that exist in all societies make it
difficult for most people to choose to belong to a society other
than that which they are born into; and because unlike in
Locke’s time the entire world is now divided into nation states
that strictly regulate entry, such that for most people there is
no other alternative than where they are born.

And subtle

because due to the practical constraints the process of
consenting is such that “people take no notice of it and,

17
18
19

Id. at 67
Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
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thinking it not done at all, or not necessary, conclude they are
naturally subjects as they are men."20

It is but a short step

from here to the general view that in reality many relationships
are far from freely chosen and that what may appear as consent
often is an illusion masking the largely involuntary and
socially constructed nature of relationships.
This is an easy move for Aristotle whose starting point,
unlike Locke’s “state of perfect freedom,” is that “man is by
nature a political animal”;21 and that rather than arising from
consent “the state is a creation of nature”22 and is “by nature
clearly prior to the family and to the individual.”23

Social

life is an involuntary relationship because “a social instinct
is implanted in all men by nature”24 and “the individual when
isolated, is not self-sufficing.”25

From this staring point, a

variety of involuntary relationships exist in society: “For that
someone should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only
necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are

20

Id.
ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 3.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 4.
24
Id.
25
Id. Compare SANDEL, supra note 5, at 150: “…to say that the members of a
society are bound by a sense of community is not simply to say that a great
many of them profess communitarian sentiments and pursue communitarian aims,
but rather that they conceive their identity…as defined to some extent by the
community of which they are a part. For them, community describes…not a
relationship they choose as in a voluntary association) but an attachment
they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity.”
21
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marked out for subjection, others for rule”;26 and “the male is
by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules,
and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, entails to
all mankind.”27

One can reject Aristotle’s view of these

particular relationships and still find there a case for the
non-consensual nature of many relationships in social life.
Yet in Aristotle too we find the yin-yang of communal and
individualistic thinking, bearing in mind that the notion of
individual rights was not highly developed in that era of
history.28

Thus, subject to its regulation for the common good,29

Aristotle supports private property –- the essence of which is
to empower the owner to choose with whom to associate with
regard to the property’s use.30

And this for a variety of

26

ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 6.
Id. at 7.
28
See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Bobbs Merrill 1962). For Aristotle
one’s ethical duties, i.e., how one should treat others, derive from the
pursuit of one’s highest end, which is happiness, which comes about through
the development of one’s excellences and virtues, which include the way one
treats others. See also THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE 1-24 (H. MacL. Currie, ed.,
J.M. Dent & Sons 1973)(discussing the roots of the idea of respect for the
individual in periods of ancient Greek and Roman democracy and its maturation
-- “the essential dignity and sanctity of human life, freedom of thought and
criticism,…popular government…, the rule of law based on the impartial
administration of justice,” at 5 -- in western civilization beginning with
the Renaissance and Protestant Reformation).
29
“It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it
common; and the special business of the legislature is to create in men this
benevolent disposition.” ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 26. “Clearly, then, the
legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at
moderation in their amount.” Id. at 34. “The true forms of government,
therefore, are those in which the one, or the few, or the many govern with a
view to the common interest; but governments which rule with a view to the
private interest, whether of the one, or of the few, or of the many, are
perversions.” Id. at 61.
30
See, e.g., Thomas Kleven, Private Property and Democratic Socialism, 21 LEG.
STUD. FOR. 1, 12-21 (1997)(“Ownership confers decision making power over
27
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reasons with both collective and individualistic overtones.
“When a man feels a thing to be his own,” this contributes to
personal pleasure and thereby to the development of one’s
excellence;31 and the greatest pleasure is “in doing a kindness
or service…(to others), which can only be rendered when a man
has private property.”32

And private property enables people to

“set an example of liberality” or “liberal action,” deriving
from “the use which is made of property.”33

And, finally, “there

is much more quarreling among those who have all things in
common,”34 such that with private property “men will not complain
of one another, and they will make more progress, because
everyone will be attending to his own business.”35
And, while people (alas only men to Aristotle) are
naturally political animals, Aristotle acknowledges that “they

things, the right to determine how things are to be used and who may have
access to them, which in turn means that others who do not have the right to
share therein, i.e., who are not co-owners, have the duty not to interfere
with the owner’s control,” at 18); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of
the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29
BUFF. L. REV. 325, 359 (1980)(“To say that one owned property was to say that
the owner had some set of rights, privileges, powers and immunities.
Moreover, one who did not own property had a set of no rights, duties,
disabilities, and liabilities relative to the owner.”). But compare State of
New Jersey v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971)(overthrowing trespass
conviction of field worker and attorney for organizations assisting migrant
farm workers on ground that property owner does not have right to exclude
them from visiting with workers in their on-premises living quarters so as to
deny workers the “opportunity to enjoy associations customary among our
citizens”).
31
ARISTOTLE, supra note 5, at 26.
32
Id.
33
Id. at 27.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 26.
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are also brought together by their common interests,”36 implying
that free choice is at play in establishing political
relationships.

And, while Aristotle is not an unadulterated fan

of democracy and sees advantages to other forms of government as
well, he does note as among democracy’s virtues that “a man
should live as he likes,”37 also implying freedom of choice in
relationships.
To conclude this part of the discussion, I do not propose
to try to resolve here which of the foregoing perspectives, the
individualistic or the communal, is the more correct or
appropriate for addressing associational issues.

Indeed, the

debate over that question is probably endless and unresolvable,
and in the real world most or all societies have an ethos that
incorporates some aspects of both approaches albeit with
differing emphases in differing societies.

Therefore, we should

expect to find societies resolving associational issues
differently in keeping with the nuances of their mores.

And

within societies we should expect to find associational issues
resolved differently over time as their mores evolve.
C. The Institution of Marriage
To illustrate the point just made, let’s briefly look at
the institution of marriage.

In the United States the

establishment of a marital relationship is widely viewed as the
36
37

Id. at 60.
Id. at 144.
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choice of the two parties, both of whom must agree and either
one of whom may block its establishment.

In this context, the

party who doesn’t want an association prevails over the party
who does, and therefore controls the outcome.
Individualistic values underlie this arrangement.

To force

someone to marry another against one’s will would be seen as a
violation of human dignity and of the fundamental individual
right to control one’s destiny with regard to such matters.
This sentiment flows from cultural notions of what marriage
entails.

The intimacy of marriage, ideally based on love and

typically involving sexual relations, is one obvious element.
More collective notions are also likely at play, such as the
perceived importance of the nuclear family to society’s
successful functioning and of the importance of marriage based
on mutual choice to the success of the nuclear family.
Underlying all these elements are debatable value and
empirical judgments.

A society in which the extended family is

a more important institution than the nuclear family might well
see marriage based on love and the choice of the two parties as
promoting the latter and undermining the former.

This may help

explain the practice in some societies, perhaps more so in the
past though still found today, of arranged marriages.38

It might

38

See, e.g., GWEN J. BROUDE, MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND RELATIONSHIPS 192-195 (ABC-CLIO
1994)(comparing arranged marriage practices in various cultures); Xu Xiaohe &
Martin King White, Love Matches and Arranged Marriages, in NEXT OF KIN 420
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be thought that marriage based on intense interpersonal intimacy
and mutual choice will weaken the ties to other members of and
lead couples to separate themselves from an extended family; and
that marriages arranged by one's family or parents, with the new
couple perhaps living with one of their families as is often the
case in societies with arranged marriages, will strengthen
extended family ties.
No doubt arranged marriages have often taken into account
the wishes of the parties.

When not, arranged marriage is an

instance of an association that one or both of the parties may
not want.

While ultimately it may be difficult to force an

adamantly unwilling party to marry, various social pressures can
be applied to induce compliance.

Threats of disinheritance and

ostracism have frequently been used, even in societies as
individualistic as the United States, to induce compliance with
parental wishes, and in some societies even the killing of a

(Lorne Tepperman & Susannah J. Wilson, eds., Prentice Hall 1993)(comparing
and contrasting arranged marriage practices in China and Japan). For
articles on recent efforts at reform in societies with historical traditions
of patriarchal marital practices, including arranged marriage, see, e.g.,
Michele Brandt & Jeffrey A. Caplan, The Tension Between Women’s Rights and
Religious Rights: Reservations to CEDAW by Egypt, Bangladesh and Tunisia , 12
J. L. & RELIGION 105 (1995-96); Mark Cammack, Lawrence A. Young & Tim Heaton,
Legislating Social Change in an Islamic Society - Indonesia’s Marriage Law,
44 AM. J. COMP. L. 45 (1996); Anna M. Hann, Holding Up More Than Half the Sky:
Marketization and the Status of Women in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEG. ISS. 791
(2001); Shirley L. Wang, The Maturation of Gender Equality Into Customary
International Law, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 899 (1995); Sherifa Zuhur,
Empowering Women or Dislodging Sectarianism: Civil Marriage in Lebanon , 14
YALE J. L. & FEM. 177 (2002).
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recalcitrant child has been condoned or accepted.39
While mutual choice is the prevailing approach to the
establishment of a marriage in this society, the right to make
that choice has been severely limited by requirements such as
not already being married to someone else or not being of the
same gender.

Such requirements reflect societal concerns, like

promoting procreation or perceived moral offensiveness, that are
thought to trump the value of individual choice even with regard
to a matter as intimate as marriage.

For example, anti-polygamy

laws might be justified as protecting women and children from
perceived oppression or ensuring that there are potential
partners for everyone who wants to marry; and banning same-sex
marriage might be justified as promoting procreation or
preventing practices that violate societal mores.

Nevertheless

not only are there strong individual rights claims for allowing
polygamy40 and same-sex marriage, but polygamy has been widely if

39

For reports on countries where “honor killings” of women for various
reasons, including refusal to submit to arranged marriages, are common and on
the indifference and complicity of the authorities, see, e.g. Amnesty
International, Pakistan: Honor killings of girls and women, at http://www.
amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/ASA330181999; Gendercide Watch, Case Study: Honor
Killings and Blood Feuds, at http://www.gendercide.org/case_honour.html;
Human Rights Watch, Violence Against Women and “Honor” Crimes, at http://www.
hrw.org/press/2001/04/un_oral12_0405.htm.
40
For divergent views regarding polygamy, see, e.g., Stephanie Forbes, Note,
Why Have Just One?: An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws under the
Establishment Clause, 39 Hou. L. Rev. 1517 (2003)(arguing that laws banning
polygamy violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment per
promotion of particular religious views and absence of an overriding secular
purpose); Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and
State Constitutional Provisions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under
the Free Exercise Clause, 17 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 691 (2001)(arguing that antipolygamy laws intentionally discriminate against Mormons without a legitimate
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diminishingly practiced in other societies and there are
movements here and elsewhere to legitimize same-sex unions.41
Nor is the free choice model fully applicable to the
termination of a marriage, i.e., divorce.

In some societies,

including the United States in earlier times, divorce has been
next to impossible to obtain even when both parties want it.42

secular purpose); Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance:
Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 1501 (1997)(arguing
that anti-polygamy laws are justifiable per the contribution of polygamy to
despotic and inegalitarian societies and of monogamy to the modern liberaldemocratic state); Richard A. Vasquez, Note, The Practice of Polygamy:
Legitimate Free Exercise of Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting
Reynolds in Light of Modern Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. Legis.
& Pub. Pol. 225 (2001-2002)(arguing that harms of polygamy to women and
children constitute a compelling government interest justifying its
prohibition).
41
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, ___ Mass. ___
(2003)(denial of benefits of civil marriage to same-sex partners infringes
fundamental rights of individual liberty and equality in violation of
Massachusetts Constitution); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999)(exclusion of same sex couples from benefits and protections of marriage
violates Common Benefits Clause of Vermont Constitution); Clifford Krauss,
Gay Marriage Plan: Sign of Sweeping Social Change in Canada, New York Times,
Section A, Page 8 (June 19, 2003)(reporting on Canada’s decision to legalize
same-sex marriage). For arguments in favor the right of same-sex marriage,
see, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Law and the Family of Choice and Need, 35
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 691 (1996-97); MARK STROSSER, LEGALLY WED 23-74 (Cornell
University Press 1997)(arguing that bans on same sex marriages violate the
equal protection and due process clauses); Cindy Tobisman, Marriage vs.
Domestic Partnership: Will We Ever Protect Lesbians’ Families, 12 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 112 (1997). For arguments against or counseling a gradual
approach to the recognition of same-sex marriage, see, e.g., George W. Dent,
Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581 (1999); Linda S.
Echols, The Marriage Mirage: The Personal and Social Identity Implications of
Same-Gender Matrimony, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 353 (1999).
42
Throughout most of Europe prior to the 1800s, largely influenced by
religious doctrine proclaiming the indissolubility of marriage, divorce was
virtually unknown and annulment very hard to obtain, such that couples who
wanted out of marriage had to settle for living apart while remaining
formally married. Likewise in colonial America divorce was difficult to
obtain and uncommon, especially in the South, although legislative divorces
were occasionally granted. After independence the situation in the South
remained the same, while largely restrictive judicial divorce laws were
developed in some Northern states. By 1880 legislative divorce was dead and
most states had general divorce laws of varying degrees of stringency. See,
e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 181-82, 436-40 (Simon &
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Once divorce was generally allowed in the United States, it
was ordinarily necessary to show cause, such as adultery,
desertion or cruelty.43

This usually posed little problem when

both parties wanted out, since they could stipulate to or
fabricate cause.44

But a requirement of cause could pose a

substantial obstacle when one party wanted out and the other
didn’t.

In such instances the party wanting the association to

continue controlled if the party not wanting it was unable to
show cause.

True, the party wanting out might be able to

physically leave so that the parties were no longer living
together as a married couple, but the formality of the marriage
and the attendant legal and even social obligations would still
remain.
It is possible to reconcile the requirement of cause with
the mutual choice model.

The choice to marry in the face of the

cause requirement could be seen as akin to an agreement not to
sever the association without cause.

This rationale would seem

more convincing if the parties had a choice of marrying under a
regime permitting unilateral divorce or under one requiring
Schuster 1973); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 7-27
(University of Chicago Press 1972)
43
Comprehensive divorce laws began to arise in the United States in the mid1800s. Although initially a few states established fairly permissive grounds
for divorce, by the late 1800s restrictive divorce laws were the norm. See,
e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 436-40; REINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 28-55;
Walter Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32,
35-44 (1966).
44
See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 42, at 439 (“collusion was a way of life”);
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 42, at 55-63; Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 15-16 (1990).
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cause, as is currently being tried or considered in some
states.45

When the only available option is divorce for cause,

then society as a whole induces individuals who want the
benefits of marriage to limit their ability to exit the
relationship against the wishes of the other party, thereby
empowering the party who wants the relationship to continue.
Currently in the United States it is fairly easy to sever a
marital relationship through divorce, since most states either
have no fault divorce or impose standards such as
incompatibility or irreconcilable differences that are quite
easily shown.46

Consequently, when one party wants a marriage to

continue and the other wants out, the latter controls.
However, although unilateral divorce is now fairly easy,
society’s requirement of support for ex-spouses and of children
impinges on one party’s ability to totally end all aspects of
the relationship against the will of the other party.

Support

45

Both Arizona and Louisiana have recently adopted “covenant marriage”
statutes enabling parties to choose to marry under a system requiring
traditional fault grounds for divorce rather than the generally applicable
no-fault system. Ariz. Rev. Stat. s.25-901 et seq. (1998); La Rev. Stat.
s.9:272-275, 307 (1997).
46
See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 64-81 (Harvard University
Press 1987)(identifying 18 states as having divorce on nonfault grounds only,
2 as requiring mutual consent for nonfault divorce, and 30 states as having
mixed fault and nonfault systems that impose various waiting periods for
contested unilateral nonfault divorce; and comparing the United States to
Western Europe where only Sweden has a totally nonfault system, Ireland
prohibits divorce, and most countries have nonfault or mixed systems with
waiting periods and/or judicial discretion to deny a contested unilateral
nonfault divorce against a faultless party on hardship grounds); HERBERT JACOB,
SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2, 43-103 (The
University of Chicago Press 1988)(detailing the history of the no-fault
movement in the United States); Wadlington, supra note 43, at 44-52
(discussing the operation of divorce laws based on incompatibility).
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requirements might be rationalized in a number of ways,
involving both individualistic and collective concerns: on the
basis of a party’s having voluntarily undertaken such
obligations by virtue of choosing to marry or have children; or
the perceived unfairness of allowing total exit when a lesswell-off spouse may have foregone opportunities for selfsufficiency in the interest of the marital or family
relationship; or a judgment that individuals should be
responsible for providing for their offspring rather than
leaving it entirely to the other parent or to society as a
whole; or the contribution of support requirements to the
preservation of the nuclear family as an integral societal
institution.

In any event, support requirements depart at least

to some degree from total freedom to exit an unwanted
relationship that another party wants.

In fact, support

requirements may be imposed even against the wishes of both
parties to a divorce, as through laws requiring divorcees to
reimburse the state for welfare benefits paid to ex-spouses and
children.47
In sum, despite the intimacy of the marital relationship,
this and other societies frequently intervene through law and
social practice to prevent people who want to marry from doing
so, and to compel or induce people who don’t want to marry or
47

See Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child Support Policy:
Implications of the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996).
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remain married to do so.

Both individualistic and collective

considerations govern the institution of marriage, and different
balances are struck among societies and within societies over
time.
D. Associational Considerations Among Parties Within a Society
In this section I want to try to flesh out more thoroughly
some of the considerations relevant to deciding who should
control the existence or non-existence of associations among
society’s members.48

Let’s assume a society deciding (i) whether

to allow, prohibit or mandate particular relationships, and (ii)
who should control the outcome in case of conflict over the
existence or not of a relationship.

Every society so deciding

will have a bias, deriving from its culture and mores and likely
changing over time, of the relative significance to the decision
of various individual and collective considerations.49

Yet

48

Like the concept of society, supra note 3, the concept of membership is
complex and variable, depending on the emphasis placed on the various factors
that might be thought relevant, such as formal citizenship, voluntarily
joining and/or agreeing to be a member, presence in a society and/or
participation in its activities. Since members of a society frequently
receive more favorable treatment than non-members, the issue of whether
someone is a societal member may be hotly contested. See infra, notes 115-16
and accompanying text, re the lesser rights of prospective immigrants. See
also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)(equal protection clause applies to
undocumented alien children present within a state such that the state must
provide them free public education available to citizens and lawful aliens);
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983)(no equal protection violation for
state to deny free public education to children residing in district for
primary purpose of attending public school).
49
In this society, for example, the presumption when the law is silent is
that parties are free to mutually decide to have or not to have an
association. An alternative approach is possible, at least with respect to
the establishment of an association, namely that all associations require
prior collective approval. That the former rather than the latter is the
case reflects the individualistic bias of the society.
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although these biases will often produce different outcomes in
similar associational contexts, the considerations that come
into play may be the same.
1. Terminating an Existing Relationship.
Since individual freedom is so highly valued in this
society, let’s assume a society in which interpersonal relations
are ordinarily up to the parties involved,50 and in case of
conflict that the party not wanting a relationship ordinarily
controls, unless there are sufficient countervailing
considerations either to socialize the decision or to empower
the other party to control.

And let’s address first a party

desiring to terminate an existing relationship that the party
voluntarily entered into and that the other party wants to
continue.51

50

Like the concepts of society and membership, what it means to say that
someone is involved in a relationship is subject to a variety of
interpretations depending on such factors as whether they have agreed to the
relationship, their degree of interdependence with others, or their feeling
or being affected by what others do. Due to their common destiny, there is a
sense in which everyone in the world is involved in a mutual relationship.
Yet the extent of the relationship may have legal significance. For example,
laws requiring parental consent before a minor can obtain an abortion seem
premised on the existence of a relationship with the child that warrants
parental involvement in the decision, subject to the child’s right to opt out
of that aspect of the parent-child relationship if the child can demonstrate
sufficient maturity to a judge who thereby becomes involved in the decision
as kind of a surrogate parent. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In contrast, holding that
parents have the right to deny visitation privileges to grandparents seems
premised on the absence of a sufficiently strong grandparent-child
relationship to overcome the parent-child relationship. Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000). See also infra, notes 115-16 and accompanying text, re
the lesser rights of prospective immigrants as against those who are already
societal members.
51
Where one party wants out of an existing relationship and the other
doesn’t, several resolutions are possible. One is to allow unilateral
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As noted above with regard to marriage, individualistic
considerations do not necessarily support the right of a party
wanting out always to have the absolute privilege to completely
terminate an existing relationship against the will of the other
party.

Suppose at the inception of a relationship the parties

agree that the relationship may be terminated only by mutual
agreement and that neither shall have the right to terminate it
unilaterally.

If later one party wants out, the other who

doesn’t might claim that the first party has voluntarily parted
with whatever right it may otherwise have had not to have or
continue an unwanted relationship.

To reject that claim it is

necessary to treat the unilateral right to terminate an unwanted
relationship as inalienable, thereby making the stipulation
against unilateral termination void.

termination, a second to allow unilateral termination but subject to the
requirement that the party wanting out somehow compensate the other party, a
third to allow the party wanting the relationship to continue to specifically
enforce the agreement against unilateral termination, and a fourth to allow
specific performance but subject to the requirement that the party wanting in
somehow compensate the party wanting out. (The possible resolutions are
derived from the taxonomy of property and liability rules developed in the
classic article, Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienabilty: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089
(1972)). Only the first alternative fully satisfies the individualistic
claim of an absolute privilege to terminate an unwanted relationship over the
other party’s objection. The second alternative is next most favorable to
the party wanting out. But it is inconsistent with an absolute privilege to
terminate because having to compensate the other party impinges on the
privilege and may at times be so costly as to induce someone to remain in an
unwanted relationship; and also because it entails a concession to the party
wanting a relationship to continue, empowers that party in bargaining over
the relationship’s future, and requires that the relationship continue in the
form of whatever the required compensation consists of. Still this second
alternative, as well as the third and fourth which are even more favorable to
the party wanting in, are all consistent with an individualistic approach to
social life.
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A commitment to individualism may at times support viewing
some individual rights as inalienable, as when parting with
those rights would overly undermine what it means to be a person
and pervert a commitment to individualism.52

For example, it

might be claimed that people have an inalienable right to life
and liberty, and thus that they should not be permitted to agree
to allow others to kill or enslave them.53

But as the debate

over physician assisted suicide shows, it is far from clear that
a commitment to individualism supports making even these
fundamental rights inalienable in all instances.54

It is even

possible to claim that inalienability is inconsistent with a
commitment to individualism, such that people should be free to
part with all their individual rights,55 at least so long as they
do so voluntarily and without coercion (assuming that to be a
possible state of affairs –- a point to be developed more fully
52

See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987)(arguing for the non-commodification of aspects of the self that
are integral to personhood).
53
See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 95 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1975)(originally
published in 1859)(“The principle of freedom cannot require that (someone)
should be free not to be free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alienate
(one’s) freedom.”).
54
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997)(assistance for
terminally ill patients in committing suicide not a fundamental liberty
interest protected by due process clause); Raphael Cohen-Almagor & Monica G.
Hartman, The Oregon Death With Dignity Act: Review and Proposals for
Improvement, 27 J. LEG. 269 (2001); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted
Suicide, and Euthenasia, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL. 599 (2000); Christine
Naylon O’Brien, Gerald A. Madek & Gerald R. Fererra, Oregon’s Guidelines for
Physician Assisted Suicide: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 61 U. PITT. L. REV.
329 (2000); PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE (Robert F. Weir, ed., Indiana University
Press 1997); Melvin I. Urofsky, Justifying Assisted Suicide: Comments on the
Ongoing Debate, 14 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETH. & PUB. POL. 893 (2000).
55
See, e.g. NOZICK, supra note 4, at 58, 331 (arguing that a free society must
allow someone to consent to being killed or enslaved).
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below).56
The problem in the present context is that there are
competing individual rights claims.

Not to allow unilateral

withdrawal from a relationship does limit the freedom of the
party wanting out, but allowing it also impacts the freedom of
the party wanting in.

Thus the assertion that a party has the

inalienable right to unilaterally and with impunity withdraw
from any relationship, even after agreeing otherwise, must
contend with the individual right claim of the party wanting the
relationship to continue that to allow unilateral withdrawal
would infringe its individual rights in light of the consequent
harms the party might suffer after changing position and passing
up other opportunities in reliance on the agreement.

It is not

sufficient to rebut this claim to argue that the party wanting
in has no legitimate claim of detrimental reliance because the
party should realize at the outset that the right to withdraw is
inalienable and thus freely assumes the risk of the other
party’s unilateral withdrawal.

The issue is whether individual

rights considerations support more the recognition of an
inalienable right of unilateral termination or of a right to
hold a party to an agreement not to unilaterally withdraw or at
least to be compensated in the event thereof.
In such situations, i.e., when individual rights
56

See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
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considerations are implicated on both sides of an issue, which
may often and perhaps always be the case, it must be decided
which side’s interests are weightier.

This decision will

frequently, if not always, require a contextual analysis of
which side’s interests seem stronger under the circumstances.
For example, the claim for a right to unilaterally withdraw from
a marriage seems stronger when shortly after marrying one party
wants out and the other stands to suffer no more perhaps than a
brief emotional hurt, than when one party has sacrificed a
career in order to assist the other party’s career and then
years later after achieving success the other wants out and
would leave the sacrificing party destitute.

At a minimum the

sacrificing party would seem to have a strong claim for a right
to receive support, i.e., compensation, from the party wanting
out.
Now let’s assume that there is no agreement not to
terminate, that the parties have voluntarily entered into a
relationship without specifying either way whether there is a
right of unilateral termination, and that now one party wants
out and the other wants the relationship to continue.

Again, it

must be decided which side’s interests are weightier in context.
Let’s compare two situations: first two parties establish a
friendship and later one wants to end it while the other wants
it to continue; second, two parties mutually undertake some

27

joint economic venture and later one wants out.

In this society

today the right to unilaterally terminate a friendship is the
norm, whereas at times measures are taken to induce the
continued existence of business relationships or at least to
require compensation in the event of unilateral termination.57
The two situations cannot readily be distinguished on the
basis of a friendship’s being inherently terminable at any
party’s will in that it depends on an emotional commitment that
cannot be imposed.

In fact, by forcing people to associate it

may well be possible to induce emotional commitments that one or
both parties would otherwise reject, as when master and slave or

57

For example, although courts have been unwilling to compel performance of
personal service contracts, they will at times enjoin breaching parties such
as entertainers and others with unique skills for working for competitors.
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts s.367 (1981); William Lynch
Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High
Technology, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 33-34 (2001). Similarly, express and at times
implied non-competition clauses and covenants not to disclose between
employer and employee or in professional associations are enforced, subject
to a reasonableness test that depends on whether there exists a legitimate
protectable interest such as trade secrets or money invested in training or
whether the purpose is simply to tie someone to the firm or the effect is to
overly undermine mobility. See, e.g. Rachael S. Arnow-Richmon, Bargaining
for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of
Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163
(2001); Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the
Limits of Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49 (2001); Suellen Lowry,
Inevitable Disclosure Trade Secret Disputes: Dissolutions of Concurrent
Property Interests, 40 STAN. L. REV. 519 (1988); Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints
on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993); Katherine V.W.
Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the
Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002); Sela Stroud, Non-Compete
Agreements: Weighing the Interests of Profession and Firm, 53 ALA. L. REV.
1023 (2002). When successful such actions, although not specifically
requiring the continuation of a business relationship, may induce its
continuance by preventing people who want out from establishing alternative
relationships.
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jailer and prisoner develop affection for one another.58

And a

successful business relationship also requires a type of
emotional commitment among its associates, a commitment that is
in many ways every bit as intimate as in a friendship.59

Nor can

the situations readily be distinguished by the contractual
nature of the economic venture, or by the reliance and
opportunity costs associated with it.

A friendship too is a

type of agreement, ordinarily more tacit perhaps than the usual
business relationship but nevertheless typically entailing a
mutual commitment to respond to the other when asked and when
able to do so.

And in reliance on that commitment, and to their

detriment if the commitment is withdrawn, friends frequently
change position and pass up other opportunities.
So perhaps what distinguishes friendship from business are
collective considerations, like the centrality of business
relations to the materialistic ethic that prevails in this
society and the perceived dependence of the successful
functioning of the economic system on binding contracts.

Absent

58

Re slavery, see, e.g., NATHAN IRVIN HUGGINS, BLACK ODYSSEY: THE AFRO-AMERICAN ORDEAL
IN SLAVERY 114-53 (Pantheon Books 1977); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:
SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 322-31, 377-82 (Alfred A. Knopf 1956). Re
prisons, see, e.g., DANIEL GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 12122, 141-46 (Bobbs-Merrill 1964); GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY
OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON 54-55 (Princeton University Press 1958); HANS TOCH,
LIVING IN PRISON: THE ECOLOGY OF SURVIVAL 260-62 (American Psychological Asso.
1992).
59
See, e.g., W. EDWARDS DEMING, THE NEW ECONOMICS FOR INDUSTRY, GOVERNMENT, EDUCATION
28-29 (The MIT Press 2d ed. 2000)(emphasizing the importance to an
enterprise’s success of “giv(ing) everyone a chance to take pride in his
work,” “informal dialogue,” “comradeship,” “study-groups and social
gatherings,” and generally developing a spirit of cooperation).
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such considerations, attempting to impose on people intimate
relations like friendships might be thought to offend human
dignity.

Yet a society is certainly conceivable where

friendship is seen as so integral to its success that
unilaterally terminating friendships, at least without good
cause, is discouraged in various ways.60

Even in this highly

individualistic society people are discouraged from cavalierly
ending friendships unilaterally through social pressure, like a
bad reputation making it difficult to establish friendships in
the future.
2. Establishing an Initial Relationship
So far the analysis has been skeptical of the right of a
party not wanting an association to control the outcome in all
instances, at least as regards an already existing relationship.
Now let’s turn to the inception of a proposed association and
consider in turn first one that both parties want and others

60

See, e.g., Joan G. Miller, David M. Bersoff & Robin L. Harwood, Perceptions
of Social Responsibilities in India and in the United States: Moral
Imperatives or Personal Decisions, 58(1) J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 33
(1990)(finding that Indians tend to view responsibilities to others,
especially to friends and strangers, more in terms of moral obligations,
whereas Americans tend to view them as more a matter of personal choice);
Niloufer Qasim Madhi, Pukhtunuali: Ostracism and Honor Among the Pathan Hill
Tribes, 7(3/4) ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY 295 (1986)(reporting on the practice of
ostracism, including expulsion from the tribe, as means of deterring behavior
contrary to tribal norms and of unifying the group); Paras Nath Singh, Sophia
Chang Huang & George G. Thompson, A Comparative Study of Selected Attitudes,
Values, and Personality Characteristics of American, Chinese, and Indian
Students, 57 J. OF SOCIAL PSYCH. 123, 130 (1962)(“The American culture gives
more emphasis to personal autonomy and individuality. In contrast to this,
Indian and Chinese students give more emphasis to sympathy, love, affection,
mutual help and family bonding, resulting in sympathetic and sacrificing
attitudes”).
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find objectionable, then one that one party wants and the other
doesn’t, and finally one that neither party wants while others
do.
a. Relationships that Both Parties Want - When both parties
want to have a relationship in a society favoring the individual
right of free association, preventing them from doing so would
seem clearly to violate their rights, absent at least overriding
collective considerations.

Examples of such collective

considerations are laws prohibiting conspiracies to overthrow
the government or in restraint of trade.

In other instances,

however, assertions of collective considerations may not suffice
to overcome the value of free association.
Take the practice of the forced separation of the races, as
with mandatory segregation in the United States and South
African apartheid and as still practiced in some societies
today.61

Forced separation imposes through the use of

61

See, e.g., YAAKOV KOP & ROBERT E. LITAN, STICKING TOGETHER: THE ISRAELI EXPERIMENT IN
PLURALISM 20-21, 30-34, 74-75, 86, 98 (Brookings Institution Press 2002)
(discussing various government practices promoting the segregation of Arab
Israelis and their separation from mainstream life -- the expropriation of
Arab lands, confining Arabs in their own towns for two decades under military
rule, the requirement of permits to leave their towns, restrictions on the
sale of land to Arabs and the allocation of land on the basis of ethnicity,
the denial of government jobs and the exclusion of Arabs from military
service, separate schools for Arab children with Hebrew taught as a secondary
language -- and characterizing the situation as “separate but not equal”);
BRENDAN MURTAGH, THE POLITICS OF TERRITORY: POLICY AND SEGREGATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND 3443, 47-49, 151, 163-67 (Palgrave 2002)(detailing extensive segregation in
Northern Ireland along religious lines, but finding, despite the use of peace
lines in Belfast to separate religious enclaves so as to avoid conflict, a
lack of evidence to support the use of planning instruments to achieve ethnopolitical objectives and characterizing government policy more as one of
“benign acceptance” of separation than of design); Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnia’s
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governmental power the preferences of those who don’t want
interethnic relationships on those who do.

In the United

States, for example, anti-miscegenation laws and laws mandating
school and residential segregation prevented those blacks and
whites who wanted to marry or go to school or live together from
choosing to have those associations.62
In support of laws against race mixing might be asserted
the right of groups to preserve their ethnic purity, which might
become watered down over time if their members were allowed to
cross the line.

Evaluating the merit of the ethnic purity

argument ultimately demands a value judgment about which there
Ethnic Division Relocates to the Classroom, Los Angeles Times, October 19,
1997, at 1 (reporting on the segregation of students in schools in the
Muslim-Croat Federation with “separate-but-equal” programs for Bosniak Muslim
and Roman Catholic Croatian children).
62
Re interracial marriage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(prohibition against interracial marriage constitutes invidious
discrimination based on race with respect to a fundamental individual liberty
and therefore violates equal protection clause). Re residential segregation,
see Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)(city ordinance prohibiting both
blacks and whites from living in neighborhoods where other race is in the
majority violates equal protection clause); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668
(1927)(city ordinance prohibiting both blacks and whites from living in
neighborhoods where other race is in the majority, except with consent of
majority of other race, violates equal protection clause); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)(judicial enforcement of racially restrictive
covenants in deeds constitutes discriminatory state action in violation of
equal protection clause). Re schools, see Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954)(mandatory segregation of the races in public schools violates
equal protection clause). Compare Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959)(viewing the
issue posed by enforced segregation as one of “denying the association to
those individuals who wish it and imposing it on those who would avoid it,”
and opining that there is no neutral constitutional basis for favoring one
claim over the other); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 57 (Yale University Press 1986, 2d. ed.)(replying to
Wechsler: “What on the score of generality and neutrality, is wrong with the
principle that the legislative choice in favor of a freedom not to associate
is forbidden, when the consequence of such a choice is to place one of the
groups of which our society is constituted in a position of permanent,
humiliating inferiority).”
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may be disagreement.

To some the pursuit of ethnic purity

amounts to racism, whereas to believers it represents ethnic
pride and group solidarity.

In the United States today, judging

the worth of people on the basis of race is generally perceived
as wrong and as contrary to society’s ethos that people are to
be judged on their individual merits, i.e., by their character
and actions,63 and especially so when the government makes
invidious race distinctions.64

While in keeping with the

society’s individualistic ethic people may be entitled to their
personal prejudices and even to practice them to some extent,
they are not to use the government as a means of imposing their
views and practices on society as a whole.

So if some community

should attempt to reinstate the forced separation of the races
for the purpose of preserving ethnic purity, even if supported

63

As most eloquently expressed by Martin Luther King in his “I Have A Dream”
speech: “I have a dream that my four children will one day live in a nation
where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content
of their character.” At http://www.mecca.org/~crights/dream.html.
64
Loving, supra note 62. The debate over the permissibility of affirmative
action, see infra note 68, ultimately turns on one’s view of whether all race
distinctions are inherently invidious (or at least presumptively so), in that
affirmative action amounts to impermissible discrimination against whites by
denying them benefits based on race rather than judging them on their merits,
or whether race distinctions are more permissible when the purpose is benign
and seeks to eradicate the effects of racial oppression. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)(affirmative action in letting
of government contracts must be judged under strict scrutiny standard); id.
at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment): “In my
view, government can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on
the basis of race to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the opposite
direction”; id. at 240, 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment): “(G)overnment sponsored racial discrimination based on benign
prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious
prejudice”; id. at 242, 243 (Stevens, J., dissenting): “There is no moral or
constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed to perpetuate a
caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.”
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by a majority of both blacks and whites, that would be
unacceptable today because so clearly violative of society’s
prevailing ethic.

Nevertheless, a society is conceivable, and

some may exist today, where the preservation of the group is
seen as more important than the rights of individual members.65
b. Relationships that One Party Wants - Now let’s turn to
associations that one party wants and another doesn’t, and let’s
examine the appropriateness of forcing relationships on the
unwanting party in a society that generally favors free choice.66

65

As reflected in the past generation in an intensification of ethnic
conflict and an increased division of groups of people along ethic lines in
several parts of the world: the partition of colonial India into largely
Hindu India and largely Muslim Pakistan, the creation of Israel as a
religious state primarily for Jews and the resultant struggle for the
establishment of a Palestinian state, the civil war in Lebanon between Arab
Christians and Muslims, the Hutu genocide of the Tutsi in Rwanda, the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia into more ethnically homogeneous
states. See, e.g., SUZANNE MICHELE BIRGERSON, AFTER THE BREAKUP OF A MULTI-ETHNIC
EMPIRE: RUSSIA, SUCCESSOR STATES, AND EURASIAN SECURITY (Praeger 2002); NOEL MALCOLM,
BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY (MacMillan 1994); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF
A GENOCIDE (Columbia University Press 1998); EDWARD W. SAID, THE POLITICS OF
DISPOSSESSION: THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN SELF-DETERMINATION, 1969-1994 (Pantheon
Books 1994); KAMAL SALIBI, A HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS: THE HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED
(I.B. Taurus & Co. 1988); IAN TALBOT, INDIA AND PAKISTAN (Oxford University Press
2000); YUGOSLAVIA AND AFTER 87-115, 138-154, 196-212, 232-247 (David A. Dyker &
Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Longman 1996). In many of these areas the now divided
groups, while maintaining ethnic identity and varying degrees of insularity,
intermingled and interacted for many years in relative harmony. Various
historical factors, not all yet fully examined, may have contributed to the
recent ethnic division: historical ethnic identification and nationalism; the
exploitation of ethnic differences for their own ends by colonial powers or
indigenous actors; the imposition of nation states from without rather than
spontaneous development from within; the collapse of or failure to develop
unifying structures; population growth and scarcity of resources; the uneven
development of and increasing disparities among and within various regions of
the world. That the entire situation may be socially constructed does not
make the ethnic divisions and the emphasis on the group any less real, just
less endemic and more readily subject to change under different (shall we say
more humane) social conditions.
66
Here the obverse of the four alternatives discussed above, see supra note
48, would be first to allow the party wanting a relationship to impose it on
the unwanting party, second to allow the relationship to be imposed but
require the party wanting the relationship to compensate the unwanting party,
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As with already existing relationships, an initial problem as
regards the initiation of a relationship when the parties are
not in agreement is that there are parallel individual rights
claims.

Allowing someone to impose a relationship impinges on

the freedom of the party not wanting it, whereas enabling a
party not wanting a relationship to avoid it impacts the freedom
of the party wanting in.
required.

So, again, a balancing of interests is

Here, however, the detrimental reliance argument of

the party wanting in is unavailing, since it turns on the
existence of an agreement that induces the reliance.

Thus the

individual right claim of a party involved in a long term
marriage, that the other party should not be able with impunity
always to unilaterally terminate the relationship, seems
stronger than the claim that the party wanting in should be able
to force an unwanted marriage on another party in the first
instance.
In other contexts, however, there may be sufficient reasons
for empowering one party to initiate an unwanted relationship
third to allow the unwanting party to avoid the relationship but require
compensation to the party wanting the relationship, and fourth to allow the
unwanting party to avoid the relationship entirely. Only the last
alternative fully favors the party not wanting the relationship, whereas the
first three all concede something to the party wanting the relationship.
Even the third alternative, which of the first three is least favorable to
the party wanting the relationship, imposes a relationship on the unwanting
party, since requiring the unwanting party to compensate the other party is
in itself a type of relationship. And it is inconsistent with an absolute
privilege to avoid an unwanted relationship, since having to compensate
strengthens the bargaining position of the party wanting in and may induce
the unwanting party to establish a relationship that would otherwise not come
about.

35

with another.

To illustrate, let’s revert to the race relations

example and examine possible scenarios once the mandatory
separation of the races has been outlawed.

Let’s first assume

that whites prefer segregation while blacks prefer integration,
or in other words that blacks want a relationship that whites
don’t.67

One context might be the desire of blacks for access to

public employment or colleges previously reserved for whites.
Integration might come about once public institutions begin to
operate on a color blind basis and apply the same hiring and
admissions criteria to both blacks and whites.68

67

There has always been a divergence of opinion within and between the black
and white communities over the desirability of integration versus separation.
See infra notes 95, 98 and 102. Historically, the leadership of the black
community has also been diverse, with some like Martin Luther King and
Thurgood Marshall pushing for integration, while others like Marcus Garvey
and Malcolm X being more nationalistic. See, e.g., ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. University of Georgia Press 1995); WILLIAM L. VAN DEBURG, MODERN BLACK
NATIONALISM: FROM MARCUS GARVEY TO LOUIS FARRAKHAN (New York University Press 1997);
JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (Times Books 1998).
68
Or achieving integration in public institutions may require affirmative
action that sets aside positions for blacks or at least takes race into
account in ways that promote integration. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123
S.Ct. 2325 (2003)(public law school may consider race or ethnicity as a
factor in admissions process per compelling interest in attaining diverse
student body provided it does not set aside slots or establish quotas for
minority applicants and employs same general standards to all applicants);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003)(public university’s consideration
of race in admissions process not narrowly tailored to achieve compelling
interest in diversity per awarding all minority candidates a bonus without
making individualized determination of merit and per effect of bonus in
making race the decisive factor such that amounts to virtual set-aside). See
supra note 64. One possible justification for affirmative action in this
context is that without it the advantage that whites have as a result of past
racism that failed to judge blacks on their merits would become entrenched,
and that rectification is needed to counteract that advantage. See, e.g.
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993).
Another is that merely prohibiting discrimination against blacks is
insufficient in practice to assure judgments based on merit because the
lingering racism of the past is difficult to prove and often operates on a
subconscious or unconscious level even when people think they are and may
appear to be judging based on merit. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, The Id,
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One response to whites who object to integration in this
context is that the relationship is not forced since they have
willingly entered into it by accepting public employment or
choosing to attend public colleges.

But since public

institutions may as a practical matter be the only viable
options for many people, there is a sense in which the
relationship is less than fully voluntary.

So a stronger

response, even acknowledging a degree of forced association, is
that to satisfy white preferences for non-integration would
require the government to reinstate mandatory segregation in
violation of its obligation to treat people as equals and not
discriminate against them on the basis of race.
Now let’s move from the public to the private arena and
assume that various entities (schools, clubs, professional
associations, political parties, housing, public accommodations,
and the like) are discriminating against blacks in accordance
with the preferences of their white clientele.

And let’s assume

that laws are proposed to ban those practices, and that whites
object that such laws would violate their freedom of association
by forcing them to associate with blacks.

They might assert

further that in a society valuing individual freedom people must
be allowed the latitude to hold and put into practice beliefs
that may be offensive to others, so long at least as they
the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987).
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function in the private spheres of social life and do not
attempt to use the power of government to impose their beliefs
on others who are then equally free to practice their beliefs.
But as strong as may be these claims in the abstract, in context
there are strong individual rights considerations to the
contrary.

First, the equal freedom argument is strongest when

in practice there is genuine mutuality, and becomes weaker when
there isn’t and when the exercise of their freedoms by some
adversely affects the ability of others to exercise theirs.

For

example, the mutuality argument seems quite strong with regard
to people’s sexual preferences, particularly when they are
practiced in the privacy of one’s home so that others are not
forcibly exposed to them and remain free to similarly pursue
their own sexual preferences.69

But the mutuality argument

collapses in a society where whites control the means of
achieving success in life and use that control to maintain their
dominance by denying access to others.

As against the

individual freedom to choose with whom and with whom not to

69

See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003)(state statute
criminalizing sexual conduct between persons of the same sex violates rights
of liberty and privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). Lawrence
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(sodomy statute as applied
to consensual sex between gay men in bedroom of home does not violate
fundamental right of privacy). Compare id. at 199, 213 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting): “This case involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one’s
value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest,… let alone an interest
that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who
choose to live their lives differently.”
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associate must be counterbalanced the value of the individual
right to equal opportunity, which is also a prominent ethic in
this society and which may at times outweigh associational
considerations.70
Second, and related, the free association argument is
stronger the more private the context and weaker the more
public.

The free association claim asserts the right to do in

private that which the government itself could not legitimately
do or mandate, i.e., the right to act on one’s racial prejudices
in ways that would violate people’s individual right not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race if the government
were involved.

A society with a strong individualistic ethic

needs a distinction between the public and the private spheres
of social life, since if everything were viewed as public there
would be little or nothing left of individual freedom.71

But the

distinction between the public and the private is often blurry.
For example, white dominance in this society in the nominally

70

See Brown, supra note 62, at 493: “In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.”
71
See Kleven, supra note 30, at 12-21 (“(A) democratic society in which
people have no rights as individuals and groups, but only as members of
society at large,… would be an undesirable state of affairs… because
individuals and groups do have legitimate interests which any society worthy
of being called democratic must recognize and accord”, at 20-21); Robert H.
Mnookin, The Public/Private Distinction: Political Disagreement and Academic
Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429 (1982)(discussing the distinction between
public and private spheres as a means of identifying when government
regulation is and is not justified, and academic critiques of the
meaningfulness of the distinction).
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private spheres of social life is to a great extent a by-product
of past racist action on the part of the government.72
Furthermore, when racist practices in the nominally private
spheres of social life become widespread, they take on a public
character.

There is little practical difference, for instance,

between a law prohibiting blacks from living in white
neighborhoods and the widespread practice of whites refusing to
sell or rent to blacks.73

72

See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1849-57, 1860-78 (1994)
(arguing in a society with a history of government fostered racism and which
has since reformed, eliminating legal support for discrimination and even
racist thinking but leaving behind the vestiges of its former racism, that
“even in the absence of racism, race-neutral policy could be expected to
entrench segregation and socio-economic stratification in a society with a
history of racism,” at 1852; and arguing that the formally race-neutral
structure and practice of local government have done just that in the U.S.);
Harris, supra note 68, at 1715-21, 1737-57 (discussing slavery, segregation,
and the racialization of the law in general in the United States); KENNETH T.
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 195-203, 207-218,
225-30 (Oxford University Press 1985)(discussing the development of the
practice of “redlining” black and poorer neighborhoods by the New Deal Era’s
Home Owners Loan Corporation and the subsequent adoption of the practice by
private lenders, the participation of the Federal Housing Authority in
contributing to and promoting segregated housing patterns in the post Second
World War suburbanization of the United States while the central city areas
where many blacks lived deteriorated, and the contribution of the federal
government’s public housing program to the creation of urban ghettoes through
granting suburban communities the discretion to reject public housing and
allowing cities that accepted it to concentrate public housing in the poorest
neighborhoods); DESMOND KING, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: BLACK AMERICANS AND THE US FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT (Clarendon Press 1995)(detailing the history of the U.S.
government’s involvement in fostering segregation of its workers and in
federal programs through the mid 20th century, which “could not help but
define in part the character of the American polity and ensure unequal
treatment for Black American employees,” at 16).
73
Compare Buchanan and Harmon, supra note 62, which struck down city
ordinances mandating racially separate neighborhoods, and Shelley, supra note
62, which invalidated judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants.
In fact, racially restrictive covenants are still a valid means of
maintaining neighborhoods’ ethnic purity, so long as they are informally
adhered to and there is no outright refusal to sell to someone on account of
race. See id., at 13 (“So long as the purposes of (the restrictive)
agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would
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So the balance as between the individualistic values of
free association, non-discrimination and equal opportunity
depends on context and scope.
and religion.

To illustrate, let’s compare race

The freedom to practice one’s religion is

protected in the United States because historically, due to the
sensitivity of religious beliefs and their centrality to
people’s world views, societies’ dominant religions have often
used the power of government to oppress minority religions and
advance their religious views.74
of the above values.

This is inconsistent with all

So the purpose of protecting free exercise

is to assure all religious groups an equal opportunity to
associate freely and without discrimination in order to pursue
their religions, even though some of their beliefs and practices
may be quite reprehensible to others.75

Furthermore, to ensure

its neutrality as between differing religious and other world
views, the government may not promote one religion over others

appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of
the (Fourteenth) Amendment have not been violated”); and Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayers, 392 U.S. 409 (1968)(Civil Rights Act of 1866 bars private
discrimination based on race in the sale or rental of property).
74
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2502 (2002)(Justice
Breyer’s dissent from Court’s decision upholding parents’ use of government
funded school vouchers to enroll children in religious schools).
75
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)(free exercise rights of
Amish entitle parents to remove Amish children from school after eighth grade
and raise them in Amish life style without violating state’s compulsory
attendance law). But compare Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)(violates establishment clause for state
to create special school district for religious group, overriding religion’s
free exercise claims); State of Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp.
1208 (D.Or. 1984)(violates establishment clause for state to allow
incorporation of city completely controlled by religious organization,
overriding religion’s free exercise claims).
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nor religion in general.76

However, this separation between

church and state does not prevent government, in order to
promote the common good, from intervening in religious affairs
when their practices contravene important secular values77 or
from incidentally benefiting religion in the furtherance of
legitimate secular objectives.78

So the overall picture is of a

society where people in their private spheres of association
enjoy a relative autonomy from the greater society, the degree
of which autonomy fluctuates as their actions are perceived as
more or less of public moment.
Analogously in the racial context, on the one hand we have
whites who prefer to be with whites asserting the right to
associate so as to practice beliefs that others find
objectionable and to exclude blacks in order to do so, much like
a religious group might confine membership to believers.

On the

76

See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987)(statute forbidding
teaching of evolution unless accompanied by creationism violates
establishment clause per purpose of promoting particular religious belief);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 466 U.S. 924 (1984)(statute authorizing period of silence
in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer impermissibly endorses
religion in violation of establishment clause); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)(statute requiring Bible reading at beginning of
school day violates establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962)(same re state prescribed non-sectarian prayer).
77
See, e.g., Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)(denial of unemployment benefits re firing for cause for
use of peyote, a prohibited controlled substance, does not violate free
exercise rights of Native Americans who use peyote in religious rituals);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)(upholding against free exercise
claim prosecution of parent for violation of child labor laws re use of child
to distribute and sell religious literature).
78
See, e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002)(state provision
of educational vouchers used by parents to enroll children in religious
schools does not violate establishment clause per secular purpose of
improving educational opportunities and freedom of parents to select schools
of their choice).
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other hand, we have the fundamental secular value that people
should not be discriminated against on account of race.

This

value is as central to people’s humanity as is the sanctity of
their religious beliefs, and the need to protect it also arises
from a history of oppression.

If society is to accommodate both

of these fundamental individual interests, then racial
exclusivity is more acceptable the narrower and more private its
scope and less so the more it spills into the public arena and
perpetuates historical oppression.

Thus the case for racial

exclusivity is far weaker, for example, for a political party or
professional association than for a genuinely private club,79 and
is stronger when the preference for racial separation is mutual
and leaves avenues for those who prefer integration than when it
undermines equal opportunity.80

79

Compare Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)(nominally private white voters’
association’s pre-primary selection of candidates, where primary and general
elections ratify those selections, violates Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition
against state abridgement of the right to vote on account of race per state
entanglement in process) and Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)(same re
exclusion of blacks from Democratic Party’s primary elections), with Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972)(no state action in violation of
equal protection clause re granting of liquor license to private club that
excludes blacks).
80
A balancing test that takes into account the extent to which assertions of
free association, if protected, would perpetuate historical oppression or
undermine equal opportunity, as against the extent of the impact on
associational interests of requiring unwanted associations, might help
explain the divergent results in a series of Supreme Court cases dealing with
exclusion based on race, gender and sexual orientation. Compare Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)(application of federal non-discrimination
statute to prohibit private, commercially operated, non-sectarian school from
denying admission based on race does not violate free association rights of
school or parents per government’s overriding interest in eliminating
incidents of slavery and per school’s presumed right to promote in its
curriculum the desirability of racial segregation) and Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 1 (1984)(state requirement pursuant to statute prohibiting
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To illustrate this point further, suppose that in the name
of promoting ethnic identity people of a common ethnic heritage
congregate in a particular locale, and even take steps to
preserve the ethnic character of the area and to prevent others
from living there.81

And let’s consider two scenarios.

In the

first, while some people separate along ethnic lines others do
not, such that there are ample communities available for people
preferring ethnic homogeneity and for those preferring
diversity.

In the second, the vast majority of the major ethnic

group in a society separate themselves, leaving those in the
minority who prefer diversity no choice but to live in a
minority community.

discrimination on basis of sex in places of public accommodation that
Jaycees, a non-profit corporation that promotes young men’s civic
organization, admit women as members does not violate male members’ freedom
of intimate or expressive association per insufficient intimacy of the
relationship involved and state’s compelling interest in assuring equal
access to public goods and services and in combating the stereotyping of
women in ways that undermine individual dignity and deny equal opportunity to
participate in political, economic and cultural life); with Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995)(application of state public accommodations law prohibiting
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation so as to bar organizers of St.
Patrick’s Day parade from disallowing Group to march as a group and to carry
banner stating its purpose, although allowing members of group to participate
as individuals, violates organizers First Amendment right of expressive
association by requiring inclusion of disfavored message) and Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (application of state public
accommodations law to prohibit Boy Scouts from expelling scout master who
publicly declared his homosexuality, which Boy Scouts claimed contravened the
values it seeks to promote, violates First Amendment right of expressive
association by significantly burdening its ability promote those values). Or
does the diversity of the results reflect less sensitivity to the interests
of gays than of women and ethnic minorities?
81
One approach might be the use of restrictive covenants limiting residency
to members of that ethnic group (see Shelley, supra notes 62 & 73); another
might be the acquisition of a large tract of land to be collectively owned
and occupied by an organization whose membership is limited to that ethnic
group (see City of Rajneeshpuram, supra note 75.)
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The first scenario seems less problematic than the second.
In the first, while some people may be deprived of the
opportunity to enter some communities due to their ethnicity -for instance people who disapprove of voluntary segregation and
want into communities of a different ethnicity in order to
promote integration -- there are still available communities
that meet their associational preferences; whereas empowering
them to force their way into the unavailable communities would
undermine the associational preferences of those living there.
In the second scenario, on the other hand, the associational
preferences of most or all of the major ethnic group are met
while the preferences of many minorities are not.

And by virtue

of being deprived of the opportunity to associate with the
majority, minorities may also be deprived of comparable life
chances because, say, there is more money and therefore better
education in majority communities, or because the majority have
access in their communities to information and contacts that are
unavailable in minority communities and are integral to success
in life.82

If so, that would contribute to the majority’s

perpetual dominance within the society as a whole, and thus
strengthen the minority claim for being empowered to force an
unwanted relationship on the majority.
82

See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)(law school segregated by
law violates equal protection clause)(“The law school, the proving ground for
legal training and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts”).
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c. Relationships that Neither Party Wants - Finally, let’s
consider proposed associations that none of the parties want.
As with associations that both parties want, in a society
generally favoring free choice the presumption would ordinarily
be that the parties control when they are in agreement, unless
there are overriding collective considerations.

To illustrate,

let’s continue with the example of race relations and examine
the appropriateness of imposing integration on blacks and whites
when neither want it and both prefer separation.
Suppose, for example, following mandatory segregation that
race conscious desegregation plans, including such measures as
forced busing, are proposed for the purpose of promoting
integration in public schools.83

And suppose that both black and

white parents oppose the plans, and prefer a freedom of choice
approach that would enable parents to select the schools their
children attend.

And suppose that if implemented the freedom of

choice approach would result in substantially segregated
schools.84
Both black and white parents might argue for freedom of
choice on grounds of free association, so that everyone can

83

See Swann v. Charlotte Mechlenburg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)
(upholding forced busing as desegregation remedy in formerly de jure
segregated system).
84
See Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430
(1968)(overthrowing freedom of choice desegregation plan in formerly de jure
segregated system containing only two schools where all whites and 85% of
blacks chose to attend former segregated schools).
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decide for themselves with whom to attend school.

They might

also assert that just as mandatory segregation violates people’s
rights by preventing associations they want, so conversely do
integration plans that force people who don’t want to associate
with each other to do so.85
One possible response is that a major purpose of public
education is to help build a cohesive society through the
development of widely shared basic values, like tolerance and
understanding, that promote the cooperative behavior necessary
for society to thrive as well as the respect for others that a
society valuing individual freedom demands.86

So it might be

85

People may be forced together under non-race-conscious as well as raceconscious desegregation plans. For example, rather than freedom of choice or
forced busing, a neighborhood school approach might be implemented and might
force people who don’t want to associate for racial or other reasons to be
together. (Indeed, where education is compulsory, even freedom of choice may
force some to attend schools with others with whom they don’t want to
associate.) But a race-neutral neighborhood school approach that forces
unwanting parties together might be thought preferable to a freedom of choice
plan likely to result in a dispersal of students throughout a school district
in that neighborhood schools enable greater parental involvement and expend
less time and money on transportation, all of which may produce better
educational outcomes. Assuming that individual rights claims do not always
on principle trump collective considerations, relevant questions might be
whether the evidence really supports the asserted collective concerns
(bearing in mind that at times collective considerations are speculative and
may require a period of experimentation to see if in fact they pan out), and
whether some types of collective considerations are on principle weightier
than others when balanced against individual rights claims. For example,
when stacked up against the freedom to associate, the benefits to society of
reduced racial prejudice or of better educational performance might be
thought weightier than efficiency considerations such as increased costs,
although at some level the cost of protecting some individual rights might
impinge on the ability to promote others or might become prohibitive as a
practical matter.
86
See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 94-116 (Macmillan 1926)(developing
“a democratic conception of education“); AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 41-47
(Princeton Univ. Press 1987)(discussing and favoring a “democratic state of
education” where “all citizens must be educated so as to have a chance to
share in self-consciously shaping the structure of their society,” at 46, and
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claimed that society is better off in the long run when people
are forced to integrate against their wishes in that forced
integration reduces racial prejudice, thereby reducing the
social turmoil that results therefrom and enhancing productivity
through a greater willingness of people of different races to
work cooperatively together.
A second response has to do with the way in which
preferences are formed.

Looked at from the perspective of the

current moment, it does appear that forced integration negates
the preferences of those who prefer separation.

But preferences

develop over time, are the result of exposure and conditioning,
can change over time and under different conditions, and might
well be different in the present had past exposure and
conditioning been otherwise.87

So it might be claimed that the

current separatist preferences of both blacks and whites are the
by-product in the United States of a history of past racism and
of government participation therein, and that the very same
that to accomplish this end must “aid children in developing the capacity to
understand and to evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and the
good society,” at 44, and must “use education to inculcate those character
traits, such as honesty, religious toleration, and mutual respect for
persons, that serve as foundations for rational deliberation of differing
ways of life,” at 44).
87
Compare, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF
TASTE 468 (tr., Richard Nice, Harvard University Press 1984)(a study of how
social life conditions people’s tastes (read preferences): “The cognitive
structures which social agents implement in the practical knowledge of the
social world are internalized, ‘embodied’ social structures. The practical
knowledge of the social world that is presupposed by ‘reasonable’ behavior
within it implements classificatory schemes…, historical schemes of
perception and appreciation which are the product of the objective division
into classes (age groups, genders, social classes) and which function below
the level of consciousness and discourse”).
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people who currently prefer separation might prefer integration
had history been otherwise.

In a sense, then, current

separatist preferences may be imposed rather than freely chosen,
or at least so highly conditioned as to be virtually
involuntary, and it might be claimed that at least a period of
forced integration is needed so as to counteract past
conditioning and put people in a position to more freely choose
whether to integrate or separate.88

From this more long-term

perspective forced integration does not derogate from but
actually promotes freedom of association.
This point is particularly significant in the case of young
children who may be thought not yet capable of freely choosing
with whom to associate or not, and who due to their tender age
may be especially susceptible to being conditioned by their
parents.

This poses a possible conflict between the individual

rights of children and of parents, and raises the question of
whether parents have the individual right to raise their
children as they see fit even though that might derogate from

88
See, e.g., GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION (Norman Miller &
Marjorie B. Brewer, eds., Academic Press 1984)(containing studies in various
societies and contexts of the conditions under which the “contact
hypothesis”, which posits that “one’s behavior and attitudes toward members
of a disliked social category will become more positive after direct
interpersonal interaction with them,” at 2, holds true; identifying such
factors as contact under egalitarian circumstances that minimize preexisting
status differentials and enable cooperative behavior involving mutual
interdependence and intimate interpersonal associations; but noting the
absence of studies of the carryover of improved inter-ethnic relations in
structured environments like schools to every-day life, at 6).
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their children’s individual rights.89

An associational issue is

at stake here because the claimed parental prerogative to
control children’s upbringing asserts the right to impose on
children a relationship they might not choose to have if they
were in a position to decide, or might say when older they would
not have chosen if they had been.
In response it might be asserted, while acknowledging some
degree of parental prerogatives on individual rights grounds,
that society as a whole may intervene in the parent-child
relationship so as to protect the individual rights of children
as against their parents.90

Or it might be asserted that society

as a whole has a collective interest in raising children that is
as strong as or stronger than the parental prerogative claim,
and consequently that society has the right to intervene in or
supplant entirely the parental raising of children when that
serves the common good.91

89

See Casey, supra note 50, at 899-900 (parental consent requirement for
abortion by minor child valid provided accompanied by by-pass procedure
enabling minor to obtain abortion upon judicial determination that minor is
mature enough to give consent or that abortion would be in her best
interests).
90
For example, while the fundamental right to raise their children entitles
parents to educate their children in private school as against state
requirement to enroll them in public school, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), it is implicit in Pierce that compulsory education laws
are valid and that the state may compel parents to educate their children in
order to protect their best interests. See also Prince, supra note 77,
holding that parental prerogatives and free exercise of religion do not
entitle parents to violate child labor laws.
91
Compare, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 86, at 22-28 (considering and ultimately
rejecting the “family state” model of education whose “defining feature…is
that it claims exclusive educational authority as a means of establishing a
harmony - one might say, a constitutive relation - between individual and

50

So the fact that children are involved may strengthen the
argument for the forced integration of schools.

First, since

children may not yet be in a position to freely choose with whom
to associate, the collective interest in conditioning children
to prefer integration may be as strong or stronger than the
parental interest in conditioning them to prefer segregation.
Second, society as a whole may have a legitimate interest, as a
surrogate for children, to protect their right to receive an
adequately balanced education so that they can more freely
choose whether to factor race into their associational
preferences as adults.92
Again, a contextual analysis is necessary in order to fully
evaluate the strength of these competing considerations.

In the

real world, not only may current preferences be culturally
conditioned, but blacks and whites may not be on an equal
footing in asserting and realizing their preferences.

For

example, in some circumstances blacks may prefer integration but

social good based on knowledge,” at 23); PAULA RAYMON, THE KIBBUTZ COMMUNITY AND
NATION BUILDING 53-55, 233-36 (Princeton University Press 1981)(discussing the
communal living arrangements, later largely abandoned, of children in the
early years of the Israeli kibbutzim as based on the “socialist principle
that the community should replace the family” and that “(t)he kibbutz and not
the parents would provide for the child,” at 55, and the tension this caused
particularly for mothers who desired a more family oriented approach to
child-rearing).
92
See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra note 86; Smith v. Board of School Commissioners of
Mobile County, 827 F.2d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1987)(rejecting parental challenge
to public school texts as teaching “religion of Humanism” in violation of
establishment clause per the state’s “indisputably non religious purpose…to
instill in…public school children such values as independent thought,
tolerance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and logical
decision making”).
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opt for separation due to social pressure from whites who
control their access to a livelihood or who express outright
hostility to integration.93

Or blacks who prefer integration may

choose separation because so many whites opt for separation that
integrated settings are not available or because the available
integrated settings are inaccessibly located or prohibitively
expensive.94

Where those things occur, not only does it

strengthen the arguments for forced integration just advanced,
it also implicates those raised above in the discussion of
forced integration where whites don’t want it but blacks do.
On the other hand, after a period of experimentation it may
turn out that forced integration does not improve but in fact
worsens race relations and increases people’s preferences for

93

See, e.g., ROBERT L. CRAIN, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (Aldine Publishing
Company 1968)(a study of school desegregation in 15 cities, some of which
experienced resistance as hostile as mob violence and others a more
cooperative response, and generally concluding that extent of actual conflict
was overblown); National Urban League, The State of Black America-2001 at
http://www.nul.org/soba2001/sobaresults.html (reporting that 32% of blacks
polled said they have chosen not to move somewhere because they felt
unwelcome); Gary Orfield, Housing Segregation: Causes, Effects, Possible
Causes, at note 25 (Harvard University Civil Rights Project 2001) at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/index2.html (“Black fears
of violence and intimidation in some white communities are still serious
obstacles to housing choice”); R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992)(overthrowing as violation of free speech Bias-Motivated Crime
Ordinance as applied to burning of cross on lawn of black family in
predominantly white neighborhood).
94
Since whites are still economically better off than blacks, see infra note
99, they may use their greater wealth to isolate themselves in communities
that are beyond the means of blacks and may use private deed restrictions or
zoning to maintain the price of housing at levels too high for blacks to
afford. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)(rejecting race-based equal protection
challenge to denial by suburb of Chicago with over 64,000 residents of whom
only 27 were black of rezoning for low cost housing where center city blacks
would likely reside absent showing of discriminatory intent or purpose).
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educational separation.95

Or it may be that blacks and whites

continue to or increasingly prefer separation even after the
effects of historic conditioning have attenuated.96

And perhaps

95

Here the real-world data is mixed and subject to differing interpretations.
Orfield reports that Gallup polls during the 1990s showed majority and
growing belief among both blacks and whites that integration improves
education for both groups, while that at the same time both groups favored
neighborhood schools. Gary Orfield, Schools More Separate: Consequences of a
Decade of Resegregation 6-7 (Harvard University Civil Rights Project 2001) at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/civilrights/publications/index2.html. And a
Public Agenda Foundation Survey of 1998 found that 80% of black parents and
86% of whites believe improving educational quality is more important than
integration. STEVE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, TIME TO MOVE ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE
PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC (Public Agenda Foundation 1998). Measured over
time, white support for the principle that blacks and whites should go to the
same schools has increased substantially over the years, from 1956 when half
supported separate schools to 1995 when 96% supported integrated schools.
HOWARD SCHUMAN, CHARLOTTE STEEH, LAWRENCE BOBO & MARIA KRYSAN, RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA:
TRENDS AND INTERPRETATION 103(Harvard University Press 1997)[hereinafter RACIAL
ATTITUDES](reporting on and analyzing Gallup, National Opinion Research
Council, and other attitudinal polls). When the issue is personalized, there
has been a substantial increase in white willingness to send their children
to school with blacks, although that willingness declines as the numbers
change. With few black students white willingness has been consistently high
over the years; with half black students whites were evenly divided in the
late 1950s and early 1960s, but by the 1990s less than 20% voiced objections;
with blacks in the majority white objection was in the 70% range in the
earlier years, whereas by the mid 1990s whites were about evenly divided.
Id., at 140-41. On the other hand, whites have generally been unsupportive
of forced integration. As regards whether the federal government should “see
to it” that white and black children go to school together, over the years
whites consistently answered no more often than yes. And whites have
consistently opposed forced busing, although opposition has declined somewhat
from over 80% between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s to 67% opposed in 1996.
Id., at 123-25. Black support over time for the principle of integrated
schools has always been nearly unanimous, and blacks have expressed little
opposition to attending school with whites no matter what the numbers. Id.,
at 240-41, 254-55. Yet black support for federal efforts to “see to it”
consistently declined from over 80% in the mid 1960s to less than 60% in the
mid 1990s. On the other hand, while blacks were about evenly divided between
support for and opposition to forced busing when it first started in the mid
to late 1970s, by the mid 1990s support for forced busing rose somewhat to
about 60%. Id., at 248-49.
96
The debate in recent years over whether previously de jure segregated
schools should be relieved of their judicially supervised obligation to
desegregate turns on differing perceptions of whether the vestiges of de jure
segregation have in fact sufficiently attenuated, despite the persistence of
de facto residential and school segregation, that school districts should not
be held responsible for the on-going segregation. See, e.g., Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495-96 (1992)(“Where resegregation is a product not of
state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional
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at the same time, as a result of governmental efforts to
equalize opportunity in other areas of social life, white
dominance diminishes and the economic and political power of
blacks and whites becomes more equal.

A society is certainly

conceivable where ethnic groups freely choose to live and go to
school separately in order to preserve their ethnic identity or
because they just don’t get along well in those arenas, while
they interrelate on equal terms in other areas of social life.
Under such circumstances the justification for forced
integration weakens, and the more it can be seen as violating
the individual right to choose one’s associations.
Currently the United States seems somewhere in the middle.
As a result of both voluntary and forced integration, school and
neighborhood segregation decreased somewhat following the demise
of mandatory segregation.

But most blacks and whites still

continued to attend largely segregated schools and live in
largely segregated neighborhoods, and racial separation in those

implications…As the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these
demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a current racial
imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior de jure system”);
Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,
249-50 (1991)(standard for determining whether desegregation decree should
have been terminated is whether school board “had complied in good faith with
the desegregation decree since it was entered, and whether the vestiges of
past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable”); id. at
251-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting)(“I believe a desegregation decree cannot be
lifted so long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned
in Brown I persists and there remain feasible methods of eliminating such
conditions”).
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spheres has increased in recent years.97

Overt racial prejudice

has decreased somewhat,98 and the avenues of opportunity have
opened a bit;99 but blacks are still subjected to substantial

97

Racial segregation in schools began to diminish in the late 1960s and early
1970s when courts began to vigorously enforce desegregation. The degree of
racial separation of black children reached its lowest point in the mid to
late 1980s, has been increasing since then, and has now returned to about the
level of the earlier years. See, e.g., Erica Brandenburg & Chungmei Lee,
Race in American Public Schools: Rapidly Resegregating School Districts
(Harvard University Civil Rights Project 2002) at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
civilrights/publications/index2.html; Orfield, supra note 95, at 11-12, 1516, 23-26, 28-42. These studies attribute the increased school segregation
of the 1990s to the movement of whites to suburbia, the increased
concentration of minorities in central cities, and the Supreme Court’s
deemphasis on desegregation. See supra, note 96. Orfield also reports on
high and unchanging levels of residential segregation between 1980-2000.
Orfield, supra note 93, at 39-40. Despite black preference for and
increasingly favorable attitudes of whites toward residential integration,
see id., at notes 25, 44-45, 50, and infra note 98, segregation may be high
in fact due to the wide income differentials between blacks and whites. See
infra, note 99.
98
Over the years there has been a substantial increase in white willingness
to vote for a black presidential candidate (from 63% no in 1958 to 95% yes in
1997) and in favorable attitudes toward interracial marriage (from 62%
support for laws against intermarriage in 1963 to 87% opposition in 1996 and
from 96% disapproval of intermarriage in 1958 to 67% approval in 1997).
RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note 95, at 106-07. White support for the principle of
integrated education and in willingness for their children to attend
integrated schools has also increased substantially, although they have been
generally unsupportive of forced integration. See infra note 95. Likewise,
while still somewhat ambivalent, whites have become more supportive of
residential integration. In 1963, 39% of whites strongly agreed and only 19%
strongly disagreed that whites should have the right to keep blacks out of
their neighborhoods, whereas by 1996 65% strongly disagreed and only 6%
strongly agreed; similarly, white support for open housing laws grew from 34%
in 1972 to 67% in 1996. RACIAL ATTITUDES, supra note 95, at 106-07, 123-25.
And while in 1958 45% of whites indicated they would definitely or might move
if blacks moved next door and 79% if blacks moved into the neighborhood in
great numbers, by 1997 the respective figures were 2% and 25%; similarly, 69%
of whites preferred all or mostly white neighborhoods in 1972, whereas by
1995 the figure declined to 43%. Id., at 140-41. See also Maria Krysan,
Data Update to Racial Attitudes in America (2002) at http://tigger.uic.edu/
~krysan/racialattitudes.htm (reporting on polls showing a decline between
1990 and 2000 from 48% to 31% in the number of whites opposed or strongly
opposed to living in neighborhoods more than half black).
99
The gap in high school graduation as between whites and blacks has
decreased substantially over the years: in 1978, 67.9% of whites and 47.6% of
blacks 25 and over had completed four or more years of high school, whereas
by 1998 the gap had decreased to 83.7% for whites versus 76.0% for blacks;
and for 25-29 year olds the completion rates for whites and blacks was
virtually identical, 88.1% versus 87.6%; however, while the gap has decreased
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racial discrimination,100 and whites still disproportionately
dominate positions of power.101

Meanwhile the integrationist

over the years, the graduation rate for blacks continues to lag behind that
of whites (73.4% versus 81.6% in 1998) and the gap actually increased a bit
between 1994-1998. WILLIAM B. HARVEY, MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2000-2001,
Tables 1 & 3 (American Council on Education 2001). On the other hand, while
many more blacks attend college now than before, due to a substantially lower
graduation rate the gap in completion rates has not improved over the years;
between 1978-1998 the four-or-more-years-of-college completion rate for
blacks 25 years or older increased from 7.2% to 14.7%, while the rate for
whites actually increased a bit more from 16.4% to 25.0%. Id., at Tables 3,
4 & 9. Likewise the income gap between whites and blacks continues to be
substantial, has remained about the same percentage-wise for the past 40
years or so, and in gross dollars has grown substantially over that time. In
1967 mean family income for whites was $9,116 and for blacks was $5,916 or
65% of that for whites, whereas in 1998 the figure for whites was $62,384 and
for blacks was $38,563 or 62% of that for whites. Joint Center for Political
and Economic Studies, Joint Center Data Bank, Income and Wealth at http://
www.jointcenter.org.
100
See, e.g., Black/White Relations in the United States-1997 at http://www.
gallup.com/poll/specialreports/socialaudits/sa970610.asp (1997 Gallup poll
showing that between 25%-45% (depending on age and gender) of black
respondents reported experiencing discrimination in the past 30 days while
shopping, between 15%-32% while dining out, and between 10%-23% at work -with the highest incidence in all categories reported by black men between
18-34, 34% of whom also reported experiencing discrimination by police);
Krysan, supra note 94 (reporting on 2000 survey showing 64% of blacks and 33%
of whites believe discrimination is a cause of racial inequality, 1999 survey
showing 59% of blacks believe blacks do not have as good a chance as whites
to get jobs for which they are qualified, and 2001 survey showing 51% of
blacks believe blacks do not have as good a chance as whites to get housing
they can afford and 47% of not having as good a chance as whites of getting a
good education whereas almost 90% of whites who believe they do); National
Urban League, supra note 89 (reporting that of those blacks polled who have
tried to get a mortgage 25% said they had experienced discrimination);
Orfield, supra note 93, at notes 42-43 (reporting on continuing and massive
discrimination against blacks in housing); U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission, Race-Based Charges at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/race.html
(reporting during fiscal years 1992-2001 an annual average of more than
29,000 complaints of race-based employment discrimination, roughly 12%-13% of
which on the average and 19% in 2000/2001 received meritorious resolutions).
101
African-Americans comprise about 12% of the population of the United
States. U.S. Census Bureau, Profile of General Demographic Characteristics:
2000. Yet as of 1/31/00 the number of black elected officials, although at
an all time high and almost seven times the number in 1970, represented less
than 2% of all elected officials. David A. Bositis, Black Elected Officials:
A Statistical Summary, 2000 (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies,
2002) at http://www.jointcenter.org/whatsnew/beo-2000/index.html. And blacks
represent less than 5% of federal judges and less than 4% of lawyers, and own
only about 4% and account for less than 1% of the profits of the nation’s
non-farm businesses. Federal Judicial Center at http://air.fjc.gov/history/
judges_frm.html; ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the
Profession, Miles to Go 2000: Progress of Minorities in the Legal Profession
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push following the end of mandatory segregation seems to have
waned somewhat in recent years,102 and there seems to be
substantial support among both blacks and whites for school
vouchers and other free choice options.103
At this juncture, therefore, it is an open question whether
the considerations supporting efforts to promote school
integration continue as once thought to outweigh those
supporting freedom of choice.

If a shift to freedom of choice

were to result in schools and communities available both for
those blacks and whites preferring ethnic homogeneity and for
those preferring diversity, and if it were to contribute to
equalized opportunity for blacks, then freedom of choice would
9 at http://www.abanet.org/minorities; U.S. Census Bureau, Black-Owned
Businesses: 1997 (October 2000).
102
See, e.g., FARKAS & JOHNSON, supra note 95 (reporting that both black and
white parents believe educational quality to be more important than
integration); National Urban League, supra note 93, (reporting on 2001 survey
of black adults showing 60% believing the primary focus of black
organizations should be economic opportunity, 24% political leadership, and
only 7% integration). But compare id. (also reporting that 80% of blacks
polled prefer living in racially mixed neighborhoods); Orfield, supra note 93
at note 25 (reporting on a 1997 Gallup poll showing that blacks
overwhelmingly prefer integrated to all black areas); Orfield, supra note 95,
at 7, 9-11 (arguing that continuing efforts to desegregate schools is
consistent with black support for quality education in light of evidence that
integration improves opportunities for blacks).
103
In a Washington Post Survey of 2001, 45% of the respondents supported and
50% opposed vouchers. In an American Viewpoint poll of 1997, containing
somewhat different wording from the Washington Post Survey, 67% supported and
28% opposed vouchers. In Gallup polls on allowing the choice of private
schools at public expense, in 1999 41% supported and 55% opposed, whereas in
1993 24% supported and 74% opposed. See Public Agenda at www.publicagenda.
org. The support for vouchers appears to be somewhat greater among blacks
than whites, although the support among both groups may be declining. In
polls conducted by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, in
1998 48.1% of blacks and 41.3% of whites supported vouchers, whereas in 1997
the figures were 55.8% for blacks and 47.2% for whites. See Joint Center
Data Bank, National Opinion Poll 1996-2000 at www.jointcenter.org. And the
National Urban League, supra note 89, reported that 41% of blacks polled in
2000 supported vouchers, but only 34% in 2001.
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promote both associational and egalitarian values.

But freedom

of choice would produce a stark conflict between these values,
and therefore be of more dubious merit, if it were to result in
an inferior education and reduced life chances for blacks.
E. Associational Issues When Society is a Party
Now let’s address associational conflicts when society
itself is a party, and compare their resolution to how
associational conflicts among the members of a society are
handled.
First, let’s address situations when some party wants out
of an existing relationship with a society, using emigration and
secession as examples.

Currently, international law guarantees

the right of people to freely leave their countries, and most
countries adhere to this norm.104

This right came about only

after an intense international campaign and against the
objections of countries, mostly underdeveloped or from the
Communist bloc, who feared that free emigration would hurt them
through the loss of people whom they had devoted their resources
to educate and train and who could contribute to their
development.

However, the objectors succumbed to the pressure

104

See Thomas Kleven, Why International Law Favors Emigration Over
Immigration, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AMER. L. REV. 69, 71-73 (2002). The right to
leave is guaranteed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13,
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 12(1)&(2), and
various regional treaties.
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of the more powerful Western nations.105
Individualistic considerations support the right to freely
emigrate, which is tantamount to empowering people who don’t
want to associate anymore with their countries to unilaterally
terminate that relationship.106

This is akin to allowing a party

to a marriage to freely exit, and is in fact more favorable than
the common practice under permissive divorce laws that allow
unilateral termination but often require the relationship to
continue through the imposition of support obligations.
Analogously, some countries allow people to emigrate only after
completing military or other mandatory public service and for
professionals like doctors only after practicing for a time.107
Such limitations represent a balancing of interests as
between the claimed individual right to associate or not with
whom one chooses and collective considerations like compensating
society for the benefits one has received during the
association.

Looking at society as analogous to another person

with whom a party might have an association, compensation might
be justified in individualistic terms.

The receipt of benefits

105

For a history of the international recognition of the right to freely
emigrate, see ALAN DOWTY, CLOSED BORDERS: THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
111-41 (Yale University Press 1987).
106
For a more thorough discussion of the individualistic and collective
considerations relating to freedom of movement in the international context,
see Kleven, supra note 104, at 74-83.
107
See generally U.S. Department of State, 1999 Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices (available on the Dept. of State’s website). Cuba, for
example, requires doctors and other professionals to practice 3 to 5 years
before being eligible for an exit permit.
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from a society can be seen as giving rise to a tacit agreement
to perform expected social obligations in return, or to an
implied contract to do so lest the party otherwise be unjustly
enriched at society‘s expense.

As noted above, Locke comes

surprisingly close to using such reasoning to posit that thereby
someone becomes permanently tied to a society, so that one
cannot then sever the relationship without society’s consent.108
And societies are certainly conceivable where people are seen, a
la Aristotle perhaps, as being irrevocably tied to their
societies by virtue of being born into them -- much like family
life is often viewed.
Although current international practice as regards
emigration is not so collectively tilted, that is not the case
with secession.

When a group of people occupying a particular

portion of a country desire to withdraw and either form their
own nation or join another, the current international standard
and practice is that nations’ sovereignty over their territory
entitles them to prevent secession without their consent.109

108

LOCKE, supra note 14, and accompanying text.
I refer here to the ability of part of an established international State
to freely secede without the consent of the State -- bearing in mind that
since international law is still not very highly developed and is still
heavily intertwined with power politics among nations, it is difficult to be
definitive about it. That said, the principles of self-determination and
non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State would seem to imply that
a State’s laws govern when parts of a State may withdraw. If a State’s law
permits withdrawal, even unilaterally, then there is consent. If not, then
it would seem that a State ordinarily has the right to prevent a unilateral
secession, by force if necessary, and that other states are ordinarily
obliged not to intervene (except perhaps to prevent the excessive use of

109
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There is, though, a free association claim here, analogous to
that of an emigrant, not to have to remain in a society against
one’s will; or analogous to the claim of religious or other
groups within a society of the right to a relatively autonomous
sphere within which to pursue their destinies.
Again, the explanation for this divergence seems one of
context and scope, there being factors that heighten the
significance of collective considerations when a portion of a
country secedes.

When that happens not only are people lost but

land and other resources as well, so that the harmful impact on
the rest of society intensifies.

And while the cumulative

effect of individual emigration can be substantial over time,
secession may cause an immediate and tremendous impact that may
be more difficult for a society to cope with.110

And unlike

force or in those instances when there is a right to secede). See JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 84-106, 114-18, 215-18
(Clarendon Press 1979). While a part of a State might assert that unilateral
secession is justified by its own right of self-determination, the State’s
right of self-determination would ordinarily seem to be overriding, except
perhaps in the case of oppression or misgovernment of an area. Id., at 86,
100, 115-17 (referring to “the possibility that the principle [of selfdetermination] will apply to territories which are so badly misgoverned that
they are in effect alienated from the metropolitan State,” but suggesting
that the concept is highly controversial and applicable if at all in modern
times only to Bangladesh). See also, infra, notes 111 and 119. Now as a
practical matter part of a State may be strong enough to successfully secede
without consent, to establish de facto self-governance and other incidents of
statehood, and to receive recognition as a State by the international
community. Here it would seem more appropriate to say not that the new State
had a right to secede but that the international community has acknowledged
practical reality and ratified the successful secession after the fact. See
CRAWFORD, supra, at 248-66.
110
Societies do at times suffer immediate mass emigrations in times of famine,
war or internal strife, frequently resulting from oppression within the
societies themselves. See, e.g., infra note 119 (regarding the mass
migration of millions of Hindus and Moslems between India and Pakistan
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group autonomy within a society, secession entails a more
complete departure from the association, whereas relatively
autonomous groups within a society are still subject to its
ultimate authority.
Still, if freedom of association is to be taken seriously
as a fundamental individual and group right, areas that want to
secede from a society have an interest that must be considered.
This makes the reasons prompting secession relevant.

Thus a

portion of a society wanting to secede because it is being
oppressed by the rest of society would seem to have a stronger
claim than one that wants to secede so as to gain control over
the bulk of a society’s resources or engage in some practice
like slavery that contravenes society’s fundamental values.111
And if society is not willing to let an area go, then it may
have the obligation to accommodate the desire for separation by
providing opportunities for relative autonomy, like
decentralizing society into states or provinces with their own

following partition); Susanne Schmeidl, Conflict and Forced Migration: A
Quantitative Review in GLOBAL MIGRANTS, GLOBAL REFUGEES 62 (Aristide R. Zolberg &
Peter M. Benda, eds., Berghahn Books 2001).
111
For commentary on the right to secede, see, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Secession
and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 177
(1991)(arguing for right to secede when territory illegally annexed but not
on grounds of nationality or group cohesiveness alone); Alan Buchanan,
Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 53
(1995)(arguing for right to secede of groups suffering severe injustices at
the hands of the state but otherwise no general right to secede); Robert W.
McGee, The Theory of Secession and Emerging Democracies: A Constitutional
Solution, 28 STAN. J. INT’L L. 451 (1992)(arguing for a right to secede).

62

governments and powers.112
Now let’s address situations when some party wants to
establish an association with a society, using immigration and
the merger of societies as examples.

Current international

practice as regards immigration is the opposite from emigration.
While a party is substantially free to leave and sever the
relationship with one’s country, there is no comparable right to
enter and become a member of another society.

Rather, pursuant

to the principle of national sovereignty, societies have the
virtually unfettered right to refuse entry to outsiders.113
Similarly, a society’s national sovereignty entitles it to
reject mergers sought by other societies.114
This application of the principle of national sovereignty
is akin within a society to a party’s asserting the absolute
right to refuse associations with others.

But in that context

we found reason to question the absoluteness of such a right, as
when it would contribute to others’ oppression or harm the

112

See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J. INT’L L.
1, 66 (“In most instances, self-determination should come to mean not
statehood or independence, but the exercise of what might be termed
‘functional sovereignty.’ This functional sovereignty will assign to substate groups the powers necessary to control political and economic matters
of direct relevance to them, while bearing in mind the legitimate concerns of
other segments of the population and the state itself”.).
113
See KLEVEN, supra note 104, at 71.
114
Prior to the now virtually world-wide extension of the nation-state system,
a State’s acquisition of territory from indigent peoples not inhabiting a
recognized state by conquest or cession (typically under threat of force) was
commonplace. See CRAWFORD, supra note 109, at 173-74. In modern times,
forcible annexation or consolidation would seem clearly to violate the
principles of self-determination and non-intervention. Id., at 106-07, 11213.
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society as a whole.

Consequently, so applied the principle of

national sovereignty may overly protect nations’ selfdetermination against legitimate competing considerations
advanced by others wanting in.

On the other hand, there may be

situations when a society is justified in rejecting or limiting
associations with outsiders in its pursuit of collective selfdetermination, as when it is not capable of providing for the
newcomers or when the impact would so transform society that the
opportunity for self-determination would be lost.

So, again, a

balancing of interests is required, taking into account context
and scope.
Let’s consider several scenarios, starting with
immigration.

Because it is virtually absolute the principle of

national sovereignty entitles nations to treat outsiders in ways
that would violate the fundamental rights of members if done to
them.

In this society, for example, while the government may

not discriminate against its members on the basis of race, it
may indiscriminately do so and did for much of the twentieth
century when dealing with outsiders wanting to immigrate.115
Moreover, members of this society have the right to travel and
settle where they please, such that states and localities may

115

See KLEVEN, supra note 104, at 86-87. Some commentators believe the U.S.’s
immigration practices are still racist, if not as explicitly so as in the
past. See works cited at id., note 58.
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not refuse to accept them as members of their communities.116
Yet as regards immigration a nation’s right to collective selfdetermination overrides almost all competing considerations.
The only exception is that if someone can find their way into a
country, they may not be deported to another country where they
would face persecution.117
This leaves very little play to individualistic values in
other situations where human dignity is at stake.

Suppose a

minority of the world’s population occupies a disproportionate
share of the available land, wherein is located a
disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and as a result
enjoys a disproportionately higher standard of living.

And

suppose people in other parts of the world are suffering due to
burgeoning overpopulation and other factors to which the welloff societies may have contributed, like colonial exploitation
and environmental degradation.118

Under these circumstances,

116

See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941)(invalidating statute
prohibiting the transport of indigents into the state); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969)(invalidating statutes denying welfare assistance to
residents of less than one year); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489
(1999)(invalidating statute limiting welfare benefits during first year of
residency).
117
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Articles 3133, adopted 28 July 1951 and entered into force 22 April 1954.
118
The world’s population, now at about 6 billion, is expected to reach
between 8 and 11 billion by 2050, and most of the population growth will be
in the less developed parts of the world. United Nations Population
Division, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision 5, at http://www.
un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2000/wpp2000_volume3.htm. The
relationship between population growth and poverty is unclear due to the
multiplicity of variables that enter into the equation. Does population
growth in underdeveloped areas cause poverty, such that what is needed are
efforts to control population growth so as to alleviate poverty? Or does
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according the well-off societies the absolute privilege to
refuse admittance on the basis of the right of national selfdetermination seems overly one-sided.

Indeed, it seems unlikely

that nations would be accorded such a right under a more highly
developed international order and that its existence today
reflects the dominant power of the world’s richer nations over
the rules of the game.
Similar considerations compete in the context of societal
mergers.

To illustrate, let’s consider two hypotheticals:

first, India proposes a reconsolidation with Pakistan into a
single unified nation; second, Puerto Rico proposes that it be
admitted to the United States as a state.

Although under

poverty cause population growth, such that what is needed is development to
reduce poverty which will in turn lead to reduced population growth? The
answer seems to be sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both, and
sometimes neither because other causal factors like environmental degradation
are at play? See, e.g., Alain Marcoux, Population and Environmental Change:
from Linkages to Policy Issues (Sustainable Development Dept., Food and
Agricultural Org. of the United Nations Jan. 1999) at http://www.fao.org/sd/
WPdirect/WPre0089.htm; Geoffrey McNicoll, Population and Poverty: The Policy
Issues (Sustainable Development Dept., Food and Agricultural Org. of the
United Nations Jan. 1999) at http://www.fao.org/sd/WPdirect/WPre0088.htm.
Some argue along individualistic lines that the poorer countries should be
responsible for solving their own developmental and poverty problems or
suffer the consequences. However, to the extent that poverty does cause
population growth and that the countries experiencing the greatest population
growth are poor as a result of past and present exploitation by the richer
nations, then the argument that as recompense the richer nations should
somehow assist through helping to relieve the population strain or with
economic development and family planning becomes strong even in
individualistic terms. See, e.g., ANDRE GUNDER FRANK, CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA (Monthly Review Press 1967); Edward Goldsmith, Development as
Colonialism, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 253 (Jerry Mander and Edward
Goldsmith, eds., Sierra Club Books 1996); WALTER RODNEY, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED
AFRICA (Howard University Press 1981). Moreover, a more communal view of the
world as an interdependent community might suggest that the world’s richer
nations have a duty to aid the less-well-off whatever the causes of the
disparities. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 31-51 (Basic Books 1983)(discussing the “duty to aid”).
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current international practice both Pakistan and the United
States have the absolute right to reject these associations,
there are competing considerations and arguable differences
between the two situations.
One difference is that while what is now India and Pakistan
was unified under British colonialism, that relationship was
severed and the two are now independent nations;119 whereas as a
territory of the United States Puerto Rico is arguably already a
member of the society,120 and is seeking the full-fledged

119

The division of the subcontinent into separate nation-states along largely
religious/ethnic lines, India being largely Hindu and Pakistan largely
Muslim, is an outgrowth of both the area’s pre-colonial history and the
impact of British domination of the subcontinent between the middle of the
19th and 20th centuries. See, e.g., TALBOT, supra note 65, at 1-133. Despite
Indian efforts to bring about a unified, multi-ethnic, secular nation in
which Hindus would be the substantial majority, Pakistani/Muslim separatism
led to partition and the establishment of India and Pakistan (with a western
and eastern portion on opposite sides of India) as separate nation-states in
1947, accompanied by the mass migration of millions of mostly Muslims from
India to Pakistan and of mostly Hindus from Pakistan to India. Id., at 13461. Both countries contain and have experienced struggles among various
minority religious and ethnic groups. In Pakistan, Bengali separatism led to
the break away of Pakistan’s eastern wing and the formation of Bangladesh as
an independent nation in 1971. Id., at 252-59. India has experienced Sikh
ethno-nationalism and demands for internal autonomy as well as secession in
the Punjab region. Id., at 265-73. And India and Pakistan have been at
loggerheads since independence. See infra, note 123.
120
U.S. interest in Puerto Rico stems back to the earliest days of the nation.
Following the Spanish-American War Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the U.S. in
1899, and Puerto Rico was made and has since remained a dependent territory
of the U.S. JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD
21-29 (Yale University Press 1997). In 1900 a civil government under the
ultimate control of the U.S. was established. Id. at 36-43. In 1917, Puerto
Ricans were granted American citizenship. Id. at 67-76. In 1951, following
a referendum approving it and subject still to ultimate U.S. authority,
Puerto Rico became self-governing and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was
established; and in 1952 the citizenry adopted and Congress approved Puerto’s
Constitution. Id. at 107-18. Throughout its history as a territory Puerto
Rico’s economy has been integrated into and dependent on that of the U.S.
James L. Dietz & Emilio Pantojas-García, Puerto Rico’s New Role in the
Caribbean: The High-Finance/Maquiladora Strategy in COLONIAL DILEMMA: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY PUERTO 103 (Edwin Melendez & Edgardo Meléndez, eds.,

67

statehood that other members have.121

To analogize to

interpersonal relationships, one might say that India and
Pakistan were at one time married, divorced, and are now
independent parties deciding whether to renew the marriage;
while the United States and Puerto Rico are now de facto married
as at common law, and that Puerto Rico wants that status
legitimized so that it can receive all the benefits of a formal
marriage.
Secondly, the history of the relations between Pakistan and
India differs from that between the United States and Puerto
Rico, and the impact of a merger on Pakistan and the United
States differs.

India and Pakistan split in large part because

of the internal conflict between Hindus and Muslims, and there
is on-going animosity between the two.122

So if consolidated

South End Press 1993); Edwin Meléndez, Politics and Economic Reforms in PostWar Puerto Rico, id. at 79.
121
The issue of Puerto Rico’s status has been debated since the beginning.
See MONGE, supra note 120. Within Puerto Rico there have been three nonbinding plebiscites: in 1967, 1993 and 1998. In all three there has been
substantial support for statehood, ranging from 39% in 1967 to almost 47% in
1998. Independence has received minimal support, well below 5%. In 1967 and
1993, commonwealth status outpolled statehood, although by a much larger
margin in 1967 (60% to 39%) than in 1993 (48.6% to 46.3%). See http://
electionspuertorico.org/1998/summary.html; http://electionspuertorico.org/
archivo/1967.html. Interpreting the results of the 1998 plebiscite is
difficult, due to the fact that statehood and independence were competing
with two commonwealth-like alternatives -- one similar to the present status
of subjection to the ultimate authority of Congress and the other consisting
of full self-governance subject to as yet undefined economic and defense ties
to the U.S. and with U.S. citizenship only for those already having it and
their descendents -- each of which received less than 1% support and with
none of the above which received 50% of the vote. See Elections in Cuba,
1998 Plebiscite Status Definitions at http://elecciones puertorico.org/
home_en.html.
122
The on-going animosity has resulted in four wars and several near wars, and
has revolved largely around the Kashmir region of India, whose population is
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with India into a unified nation where they would be a small and
disfavored minority, and even if India should commit to a
relatively autonomous provincial status for Pakistan, Pakistani
Muslims have a legitimate concern that they might be oppressed
and unable to freely pursue group self-determination.

Puerto

Rico, on the other hand, is arguably already part of this
society, has many of the responsibilities (e.g., military
service, subjection to U.S. law) but not all the benefits (e.g.,
seats in Congress, the right to vote for President) of
statehood,123 and may have lost other opportunities to flourish
had it been left alone.

Under these circumstances Pakistan

would seem on balance to have a stronger claim than the United
States to avoid an unwanted relationship with the other party.
And if the United States were unwilling to admit Puerto Rico as
a state, at a minimum it would seem obligated, after arguably
forcing it into an unwanted relationship in the first place, to
allow Puerto Rico to become an independent nation if it so
chooses.
F. Conclusion
While the casual remark that people should be free to

largely Muslim and which both countries claim. The causes of the conflict
are varied and contested, and include not only the religious/ethnic factor
but also both countries’ efforts at nation-building and other geo-political
factors as well. See, e.g., SUMIT GANGULY, CONFLICT UNENDING: INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS
SINCE 1947 (Columbia University Press 2001).
123
MONGE, supra note 120, at 162-64; InfoPlease, Puerto Rico at http://info
please.com/ipa/AO113949.html.
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choose with whom to associate or not to associate may often be
an appropriate response, I have tried to show that in many
contexts it is not.

At times it may be appropriate for society

to prevent associations harmful to a party involved or to
society as a whole.

And at times it may be appropriate to

impose associations on parties, even highly intimate
associations, when they have made commitments that others have
relied on or when it serves the common good.

And at times these

considerations may be implicated when society itself is a party
to a contested relationship.
Inevitably, when associational conflicts arise, there will
be assertions of individual and group rights and of collective
interests on all sides, and it will be necessary to assess the
strength of the competing considerations in social context.
Rather than attempting to thoroughly categorize the relevant
contexts and considerations, I have tried to establish that the
notion of free choice in associations is overly simplistic and
to illustrate the point with enough examples to show that
associational conflicts are ubiquitous in social life and relate
to issues -- like marriage, race relations, membership in
society, and others discussed herein -- that are central to
human dignity and the well-being of society.
As always when there is conflict over such issues, there
may be many perspectives and passionate disagreement over the
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appropriate outcome and who should be empowered to decide.

The

struggle for power in social life is on-going, and associational
conflicts are at the heart of the struggle.
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